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SUMMARY
Infectious diseases, like mumps, flu, or measles, can cause devastating impacts on uni-
versities. To protect the community’s health, schools must learn how to operate during
epidemics. In the light of Covid-19, for instance, the universities in the U.S. have struggled
to bring students, staff, and faculties back to campuses. On the one hand, these schools
are often hotspots for outbreaks. On the other hand, a long-term local lockdown will likely
incur losses of financial income for the school and the local businesses due to diminishing
enrollment and limited visits to campuses and their surrounding neighborhoods
To meet the reopening goal, the schools must assess the ongoing epidemic of Covid-19
on campus and design operational plans with more robust and accurate information than
the data provided by other local agencies as support. Frequently asked questions from
the perspective of campus officials are: How can we predict potential outcomes of disease
spread? How can we evaluate strategies to control the epidemic? Which groups of indi-
viduals and locations are particularly vulnerable to Covid-19? How can we prioritize the
testing program among individuals active on campus? Answering those questions typically
involves disease modeling since models help us abstract the disease dynamics and reason
more about the mechanism of disease transmissions among the community.
This thesis targets several natural and fundamental problems for universities during the
Covid-19 pandemic using human mobility data. We propose using the on-campus WiFi
infrastructure to understand human mobility and approximate contact networks among in-
dividuals on campus. When an individual accesses the WiFi on campus, their device sends
a request to a WiFi access point which creates a record that the device was connected to
the WiFi network. From these logs, we can determine when and for how long that indi-
vidual was connected to the WiFi through a particular access point and infer the location
of that individual to the level of a room on campus. More formally, the logs give us a bi-
partite network between users and WiFi access points across different time-stamps, defined
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as WiFi Mobility data. Each connection of a user to a log at any time will be recorded as
an edge in the bipartite network. Using a projection of this bipartite network, we can infer
which individuals come into close proximity of each other on campus. We construct and
validate a network-based simulation model of Covid-19 on university campuses using Wifi
mobility data to approximate the contact network among individuals. Then, we design and
evaluate two novel methods for improving decision-making powered by the WiFi mobility
data with the model constructed. The first method outputs a more granular and localized
closure policy, causing more effective disease intervention outcomes but less burdensome
to individuals and schools. The second can discover likely chains of transmission among




1.1 Motivation and Overview
Outbreaks of infectious diseases, like mumps, influenza, or measles, can cause devastating
impacts on universities [1, 2]. The Covid-19 pandemic has exposed many challenges that
universities face to bring students, staff, and faculties back to campuses during an infectious
disease outbreak or epidemic. On the one hand, colleges may opt fear the health conse-
quences associated with outbreaks which can negatively impact the health of the students,
faculty, staff, and broader community [3]. For example, there are reports that the number
of infections significantly increases after students return to campuses [4]. Outbreaks on
college campuses can also contribute to overwhelming the regional medical system [5]. On
the other hand, there are reasons that colleges may wish to avoid completely shutting down
during an outbreak. Universities that undergo long-term closures will likely incur losses of
financial income for both the schools due to diminished enrollment and the local economy
due to limited visits to campus and their surrounding neighborhoods [6, 7]. Moreover,
students continuously taking classes online under university closures will likely experience
more negative emotion such as stress, anxiety, and nervousness, which will further affect
their learning outcomes [8, 9].
For the above reasons, colleges have strong incentives to find ways to safely operate dur-
ing outbreaks and epidemics. For instance, when the Covid-19 emerged, colleges sought
to design or improve operational plans to minimize the size of potential outbreak. Fre-
quently asked questions from the perspective of campus administrators are: How can we
predict potential outcomes of disease spread? How can we evaluate strategies to control the
epidemic? Which groups of individuals and locations are particularly vulnerable to infec-
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tion? How should we prioritize individuals for testing on campus? How can we discover
potential chains of transmission and missing infections?
Disease modeling can be helpful for answering these questions. Disease modeling helps
abstract the disease dynamics and reason about the mechanism of disease transmission
among a community. Recent mathematical models of Covid-19 in the literature have eval-
uated non-pharmaceutical intervention strategies on university campuses under various sce-
narios of testing strategies or students behaviors in response to social distancing [10, 11,
12]. However, these models are usually parameterized using summary statistics from data
on the campus community, such as statistics on enrollment. Further, these models are typ-
ically limited by their simple assumptions about human behavior, such as a well-mixing
population (or a clique network [13]). Thus, the experimental results based on these
models may be inaccurate. On the other hand, Riti and Edward propose using network-
based models, a type of computer agent-based simulation, network agent-based Models
(NABM), to avoid these assumptions [14, 15]. These methods typically require an ap-
proximated contact network that represents which agents interact in terms of real-world
data [16]. For example, Riti and Nicole et al. draw networks describing the connections
between building blocks within small residential colleges based on campus maps; however
these blocks are also estimated from summary data [14]. In addition, multiple studies high-
light the potential of course and residence enrollment data that can be reshaped into contact
networks among individuals [17, 18, 19]. However, these networks are static in general,
with a limited scope of information given from registration data updated non-frequently.
Due to the nature of the data used to construct these existing models, the closure policy
interventions considered have been limited to broad shutdowns and class closures which
can be burdensome to individuals and schools.
This thesis targets several natural and fundamental problems for universities related to
infectious disease control motivated by the Covid-19 pandemic. We demonstrate that us-
ing human mobility data harnessed from the on-campus managed WiFi network is useful
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for answering these questions. The data enables us to model the disease dynamic realisti-
cally on campus and evaluate data mining algorithms for answering related epidemiological
questions. The study will draw upon and contribute to knowledge from multiple fields re-
lated to the interdisciplinary nature of the issues, including computer science, public health,
and operation research.
1.2 Thesis statement
WiFi mobility data can assist universities in designing and evaluating strategies for
controlling infections on campus.
We propose using the on-campus WiFi infrastructure to understand human mobility and
approximate contact networks among individuals on campus. When an individual accesses
the WiFi on campus, their device sends a request to a WiFi access point which creates a
record that the device was connected to the WiFi network. From these logs, we can deter-
mine when and for how long that individual was connected to the WiFi through a particular
access point and infer the location of that individual to the level of a room on campus. More
formally, the logs give us a bipartite network between users and WiFi access points across
different time-stamps, defined as, WiFi Mobility (WIMOB). Each connection of an user to
a log at any time will be recorded as an edge in the bipartite network. Using a projection
of this bipartite network, we can infer which individuals come into close proximity of each
other on campus.
Using WIMOB to approximate the contact network among individuals, we construct and
validate a network-based simulation model of Covid-19 on a university campus. Then,
we design and evaluate two novel methods for improving decision-making powered by the
WiFi mobility data with the model constructed. The first method outputs a more granu-
lar and localized closure policy, which is more effective in terms of disease intervention
outcomes but also less burdensome to individuals and schools. The second method can
reliably reconstruct likely chains of transmissions over time, given the current noisy testing
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data.
We organize the thesis in the following outline. In Chapter 1, we present the overview
and introduction for the thesis. In Chapter 2, we define, calibrate, and validate our NABM
model. In Chapter 3, we design and evaluate our closure policies. In Chapter 4, we demon-
strate that WIMOB can be used to discover the past chains of transmission among individ-
uals and missing infections. In Chapter, we present the conclusion and discuss limitations
and future works.
1.3 Chapter 2
In this chapter, we develop an NABM for modeling Covid-19 on university campuses,
with the projected collocation networks from on-campus WiFi mobility data WIMOB as
the contact network. NABM is a simulation-based model that can describe the disease dy-
namics realistically with no assumption about the interactions pattern among population.
Moreover, NABM leverages a commonly-used SEIR framework to describe epidemiolog-
ical properties of Covid-19, such as asymptomatic infections and incubation period. The
model also reflects some commonly used operation guideline of universities for symp-
tomatic cases such as quarantine in places on campus. We calibrate NABM to different
surveillance reports of universities. The validation results demonstrate the model for sim-
ulating the disease dynamics on-campus and accurately predicts the future cases. Given
the calibrated NABM, We will further use it to experiment with different policies and ap-
proaches in the following sections.
1.4 Chapter 3
This chapter is devoted to introducing a more effective and less burdensome policy, Lo-
calized closure policy (LC), based on WIMOB for a university to control the spread of
Covid-19 on campus. In general, universities typically adapt remote instruction policies
(RI), such as removing classes into online mode based on course enrollment to reduce
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potential contact, which has side effects on campus by hampering the local economy, stu-
dents’ learning outcomes, and community well-being. We will demonstrate that university
policymakers can mitigate these tradeoffs by leveraging WIMOB to learn community mo-
bility and explore more granular policies like LC. WIMOB can construct contact networks
that capture behavior in various spaces, highlighting new potential transmission pathways
and temporal variation in contact behavior. Additionally, WIMOB enables us to design LC
policies that close super-spreader locations at the granular level of rooms, suites, or dooms
on campus. On simulating disease spread with contact networks from WIMOB, we find that
LC maintains the same reduction in cumulative infections as RI while showing a greater
reduction in peak infections and internal transmission. Moreover, LC reduces campus bur-
den by closing fewer locations, forcing fewer students into completely online schedules,
and requiring no additional isolation. WIMOB can empower universities to conceive and
assess various closure policies to prevent future outbreaks.
1.5 Chapter 4
This chapter is devoted to showing that university officials can utilize WIMOB to identify
likely sources and chains of transmissions causing an outbreak of infectious diseases on
campus. Universities might want to know who the outbreak sources are and how the dis-
ease transmits when the disease spread out on campus for some time. In particular, they
are interested in reconstructing the epidemic by discovering the sources and flows caus-
ing the outbreak among individuals on university campuses. By doing so, universities can
identify groups of individuals and locations at risk, they can prioritize testing for people,
or they can discover people who have been likely infected but not captured by testing. We
present a problem formulation with an existing efficient algorithm for solving the problem,
and the inputs are similar to the real-world data available to us: (1) a time-varying col-
location network and (2) a noisy surveillance data reporting the number of positive cases
for residential groups. Moreover, we validate the entire framework by instances from the
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calibrated NABM we have designed in previous chapters. Finally, we present a case study
of Covid-19 in one of the university campuses, Georgia Institute of Technology (GT), in
Fall 2020 semester.
1.6 Chapter 5
The thesis concludes with Chapter 5 which presents a summary of the most important





Mechanistic epidemiology models are valuable tools for predicting the likely outcome of
disease spreading among the targeted population and assisting health policy development
for intervention and control [20]. However, modeling infectious diseases, like Covid-19,
on university campuses remains challenging concerning the biological properties of the
virus are imperfectly understood in an early stage, and the campus community has a differ-
ent behavioral pattern in general. One example is mathematical models, where researchers
typically make many assumptions [21]. These models are constrained by what we know
and what we assume [13]. For instance, they might apply a hypothetical constant rate of
contact among a well-mixing individuals (anyone can have contacts with anyone else) in
the systems of equations [10, 11, 12]. These assumptions they made are generally far away
from the reality concerning a much more sparse population network varying corresponding
to different stages of a semester, see the right figure of Figure 2.2.
With the rise of computer power, agent-based simulation, has been adopted in epi-
demiology modeling [16]. The combination of agent-based simulation and network sci-
ence applying in epidemiology can yield a more effective and flexible type of models,
NABM, [22]. One feature of NABM is the model propagates the disease through physi-
cal contacts represented by edges from the network. Especially since NABM can capture
the nonlinear relation between contacts among individuals and transmissions of the dis-
ease, NABM is a more natural description close to the real-world disease dynamics [23].
Note that NABM generally has no assumption over the contact patterns among the pop-
ulation. Instead, it requires a given contact network approximated from real-world data.
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Universities can leverage much information to establish contact networks, such as course
registration data or residential records [19, 17]. This chapter proposed using the on-campus
WiFi data, WIMOB, to approximate the dynamic collocation network for constructing our
NABM.
2.2 Contribution
In this chapter, we develop an network agent-based model, NABM for modeling Covid-
19 on university campuses, with the projected collocation networks from on-campus WiFi
mobility data WIMOB as the contact network. NABM is a simulation-based model that
can describe the disease dynamics realistically with no assumption about the interactions
pattern among population. Moreover, NABM leverages a commonly used SEIR frame-
work to describe epidemiological properties of Covid-19, such as asymptomatic infections
and incubation period. The model also reflects some commonly used operation guideline
of universities for symptomatic cases such as quarantine in places on campus. We cali-
brate NABM with the contact network to different surveillance reports of universities. The
validation results demonstrate a nice accuracy of the model for simulating the disease dy-
namics on-campus and predicting the future. Given the calibrated NABM, We will further
use it to experiment with different policies and approaches in the following sections.
2.3 Epidemiological Modeling Concepts and SEIR Framework
Epidemiological models are valuable tools for human beings to analyze infectious diseases’
mechanisms and to predict the outcome of spreading. In the 18th century, Daniel Bernoulli
created the first mathematical model for studying the effect of variolation for a targeted
population with smallpox [24]. Many current epidemiological models preserve the con-
cept of both susceptible populations and the life-time immunity for infected survivors based
on Bernoulli’s observation from the smallpox population. It is common to see that epidemi-
ological modeling always starts with empirical research about the disease dynamic and its
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pathology [25]. For Covid-19, earlier clinical knowledge highlights that (1) there is a
rare possibility for reinfection, (2) there is likely an incubation period for each patient, and
(3) there is a possibility for patients contracted the disease without symptoms [26, 27].
Based on these observations, many existing compartmental frameworks can capture these
observations in the model [28]. One example is the SEIR compartmental model based
on differential equations that divides the entire population into four states: susceptible, ex-
posed, infected, and recovered [29]. In particular, the exposed state [30]. We employ a
fundamental SEIR model to demonstrate important concepts of this framework used for







= βIS − σE
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β is the rate of transmission for each contact between susceptible and infected popu-
lation. σ is the rate of getting infected for every exposed. γ is the recovery rate of the
infected population. The model has an initial condition such that S +E + I +R = 1. The




If R0 > 1, there will be an outbreak caused by the disease since the initial dIdt > 0,
otherwise the disease will die out. R0 can also be interpreted as the number of infections
caused by an extra infection within a population assumed everybody is susceptible. Note
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that the differential-equation-based model requires three underline assumptions (1) Perfect
mixing: meaning that every infected individual can infect every susceptible. (2) A constant
population: the entire population has no new death and birth, and (3) the disease dynamics
is a deterministic system. One can easily see that these assumptions are far from reality if
we use the differential-equation-based SEIR to model the disease dynamics on university
campuses. Nevertheless, recent studies about Covid-19 modeling commonly adopt the
SEIR compartmental concept as the baseline framework for constructing various models
according to their research purposes [31, 32, 33].
2.4 Data
The data we will leverage for modeling Covid-19 are defined as follows:
WiFi Mobility
We use data provided by the IT management facility at GT which accumulates WiFi access
point (AP) logs over time. The primary use of WiFi network logs is for maintenance and
security purposes. We mine these logs post-hoc to describe the mobility of individuals on
campus, which we refer to as WIMOB. Here mobility is expressed by visits to certain
locations that are demarcated by a corresponding AP. WIMOB can also describe dwelling
(duration of visits) and collocation (dwelling in the presence of others around the same
AP). Since we do not have access to other university’s WiFi data, we use GT’s WIMOB as
the hypothetical contact network for these campuses and assume that the contact patterns
shaped by WiFi network are similar to each other across different campuses.
The campus WiFi network spans 6959 APs distributed between 240 buildings (and some
outdoor locations). We label APs according to which building they are inside, along with
the closest room or space (e.g, hallway, lobby, suite, cafe, etc.). The AP may or may not
reside inside the room, however, in most cases, only a single AP is associated with space.
For less than 5% of the APs, the AP shared association to space with another AP. This
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many-to-one mapping is typically in the case of large halls and auditoriums. We resolve
such many-to-one associations by using APs as a proxy of the space they are associated
with. Therefore, individuals connected to different APs in the same space will still be
identified as collocated. Similarly, an individual could connect to the network with multiple
devices. However, less than 1% logs show that a user is connected to multiple APs around
the same time. Therefore, WIMOB is agnostic to which device connects to the APs to
proxy the presence of the individual. For this study, we obtain the WiFi network logs
retrospectively for all of Fall 2019, and the data for Fall 2020 was provided on a per-day
basis. Each day, approximately 33, 000 different people connect their devices to the WiFi
network on campus. Overall in Fall 2019, approximately 40, 000 different people connected
to the campus network.
Note, that GT’s managed WiFi network is not equipped with any Real-Time Location
System (RTLS) [34, 35]. RTLS systems use Received Signal StrenGTh Indicator (RSSI)
values from multiple neighboring APs to provide high precise localization of individuals
in terms of time and space. However, deploying such systems requires surveying the entire
network. Additionally, precision localization raises more privacy concerns. These factors
together make it challenging for universities to justify the deployment of RTLS, unlike
small retail settings that can monetize RTLS insights directly (e.g., insights on footfall can
be tied to improving revenue).
Inferring location from Logs
WIMOB is our approach to describe contact between people and movement of people be-
tween locations. The first step requires using WiFi network logs to infer when individuals
were at specific locations on campus by determining when devices were connected to the
corresponding APs. Our system mines the WiFi network logs that are populated via the
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) — a standard and widely used monitoring
protocol to organize device association behavior to a WiFi network. Periodic SNMP up-
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dates can be caused either by poll requests to the APs that log which devices are associated
with it at that time. However, devices can appear invisible to detached from an AP for
multiple reasons, for example, when devices are idle. Otherwise. SNMP updates can occur
whenever a new device connects, which is typical when individuals move between APs.
Our approach exploits this factor to first mine periods when individuals are moving, then
identify periods of dwelling between movements, and finally determine collocation when
two or more individuals are dwelling near the same AP. This system follows from other
studies that mine WiFi logs [36, 37] and the detailed processing pipeline and evaluation is
presented in [38]. This system to infer collocations has been tested against lecture atten-
dance and reports a high precision of 0.89, but a relatively lower specificity of 0.79 [38].
While it is not likely to show false-positives, it has a possibility to erroneously mark people
absent from a location even though they were there. However, for the purposes of our study,
a contact network is made over an entire day and it only needs a single collocation instance
for us to consider contact. And therefore we believe this limitation would not significantly
affect our models.
Characterizing Logs as Contact and Movement Networks
After inferring where an individual is located on campus, we represent the entire commu-
nity behavior as graphs. We describe a bipartite graph, K, that shows when a user is at a
given location on campus (Figure 2.1). This bipartite graph has edges connecting a set of
m people, P , to a set of n locations, L. An individual can have multiple edges connect-
ing to the location if they visited that location multiple times (e.g., t1, t2). The edge data
contains the start and end times of these dwelling periods. For these bipartite graphs, we
make a projection on set P to describe collocation. This projection graph, G, contains an
edge between users if they were visiting the same location during overlapping times. Since
we do not use RTLS, our approach can only identify if people were in the vicinity of the











































Figure 2.1: In a managed network, SNMP updates the logs by describing device associa-
tion to an AP at a certain timestamp. WIMOB mines these logs to characterize mobility as
a bipartite graph. The nodes are partitioned to describe people nodes (e.g., P1, P2) con-
nected to locations nodes (e.g., L1, L2). Every edge across the partition describes people
visiting locations on campus during different times (e.g., t1, t2). Projecting the bipartite on
people nodes helps construct a contact network (e.g., P1 and P2 were collocated at L1 at
t1), while projecting it on locations helps construct a directed movement graph (P2 dwelled
at L1 and then at L2).
termine collocation in the same room [38]. Since our study is limited to localizing people
indoors, we adapt the definition of proximate contact [39] where people might be “more
than 6 feet but in the same room for an extended period”. In our work, we use a lower
bound threshold of 40 minutes to determine proximate contact. Therefore, individuals are
only considered in contact when they are collocated in a room for 40 minutes or more. This
threshold was set up to account for typical lecture duration on campus (for standard 3-credit
hour courses taught 3 times a week). Every edge between two individuals contains a list
of locations where they were possibly in contact. G forms the basis of the contact-network
that we use an agent-based model to simulate. Alternatively, we also make a projection on
the set L. This projection is a directed graph, H , where an edge from Li to Lj represents
13
movement from the first location to the next within a span of 60 minutes. GT’s large urban
campus with pedestrian pathways and motorized transit services enables direct movement
between any two places on campus within the threshold. The 60 minutes threshold helps
discount erroneously labeling returning from outside campus (e.g., non-residential students
visiting two different locations between 2 days). H effectively describes how locations are
connected and which locations could be more conducive to attracting and disseminating
the virus. As a consequence, the H helps inform policy design. We compute the bipartite
graph and its projections for each day of the semester.
Asymptomatic surveillance testing data
We calibrated the NABM using the publicly reported positivity rate on different campuses,
(GT, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC), University of California, Berke-
ley (Berkeley) ), as reported through each asymptomatic surveillance and diagnostic testing
program [40, 41, 42]. The testing program used pooled saliva sample surveillance with
follow-up diagnostic testing. The positivity rate was reported each day, but individuals
must wait at least 1 week between tests. We aggregated the positivity rate by week during
the Fall 2020 semester.
Confirmed case data
When calibrating our NABM, we considered the reported confirmed cases in the counties
where the three campuses locate [43, 44, 45]. The ‘Confirmed COVID-19 Cases’ reported
in this dataset are cases that have been confirmed with a positive molecular (PCR) test.
We considered cases during the Fall 2020 semester to inform external transmissions in the
NABM.
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2.5 WIMOB SEIR NABM
In this section, we will construct an NABM that captures the spread of COVID-19 be-
tween individuals active within universities’ community. The model is used to evaluate
the effectiveness of different policy interventions and to validate reverse engineering algo-
rithms for reconstructing the epidemic over time. We consider a modified version of the
SEIR framework for simulating the spread of COVID-19 [46, 33] by using an underlying
contact network given by WIMOB, the WiFi mobility data in GT. Figure 2.2 shows the
compartments of the framework. The susceptible state (S) represents individuals who have
not been infected and can contract the disease by having contact with an infectious indi-
vidual. The exposed state (E) is canonically equivalent to the “incubation period” and is
similar to the pre-symptomatic state found in related work [31, 32]. Individuals are consid-
ered infectious when they are in either the asymptomatic state (Asym) or symptomatic state
(Sym). Individuals in the asymptomatic state are assumed to be the major “spreaders” [32]
and transmit the infections to susceptible individuals before they are recovered (R) [47] —
after 7 days [32]. Since asymptomatic is considered a state of mild severity [48], individu-
als in this state do not have a risk of fatality. By contrast, for individuals in the symptomatic
state, will be eventually isolated (Iso) (e.g. self-quarantine, or hospitalization on campus).
Once in the isolated state, they cannot transmit the disease to individuals in the susceptible
state. Unlike the asymptomatic track, the symptomatic state is considered critical severity.
Therefore, after moving to the isolated state, individuals have risk of fatality and enter-
ing the death state (D). If the isolated individual survives, they enter the recovered state.




Let t = {0, 1, 2, 3, ..., T} be the index of days in simulations. We denote the sequence
of dynamic collocation networks indexed by day t, as {Gt(At, Bt)}Tt=0. At is the set of
vertices, i.e. individuals on campus, and Bt is the set of edges. The universe set of the pop-
ulation throughout the simulation time period is given by M =
⋃T
i=1At. For convenience,
we use ai ∈M to index every person in the universe population set.
The SEIR model consists of seven compartments. Each of these corresponds to a func-
tion of population subsets with respect to day t: susceptible S(t), exposed E(t), asymp-
tomatic Asym(t), symptomatic Sym(t), isolation I(t), recovered R(t), and dead D(t). For









I→D to denote the transitions between states be-
tween day t and day t+ 1.
Model Initialization
The entire population M is fixed where M = S(t) + E(t) + Asym(t) + Sym(t) + I(t) +
R(t) + D(t) for all t. To capture the positivity out of the students coming back to campus
at the start of the semester, we initialize the system by setting a subset of M into Asym(0)
and the reminder into S(0). The initial percentage of asymptomatic is described by:
Asym(0) ∼ Binomial(M, I0)
S(0) ∼M − Asym(0)
where I0 is a parameter defined as the initial percentage of Asymptomatic at day t = 0.
New exposures
We consider two ways that an individual in the NABM could be exposed: (i) exposures
that occur due to contacts among individuals captured by the mobility network (internal
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transmission) and (ii) exposures that occur due to contacts that occur outside of the mobility
network (external transmission).
Internal transmissions happen exclusively among individuals in the model. On any given
day, an edge becomes effective, when one of the susceptible individual comes in contact
with the other which is infectious, i.e. asymptomatic or symptomatic, individual. There-
fore, for every effective edge between two such people, the probability of the susceptible
individual getting exposed is described by the transmission probability p, which is another
model parameter. The probability for an susceptible individual ai entering exposed at the
end of day t is given by the following function:
fp(ai, t, p) =

1− (1− p)e(t,ai), if ai ∈ Vt
0, otherwise
Here, e(t, ai) is the number of effective edges of individual ai at time t. Since (1−p)e(t,ai)
is the probability that ai does not contracted the disease at time t under e(t, ai) Bernoulli
trials, 1−(1−p)e(t,ai) is the probability that at least one effective edge leading ai to exposed.
In addition to exposure due to internal transmission, we also consider new exposure due
to external transmission. We consider external transmission to be exposure resulting from
the physical collocations outside the scope of mobility network. For instance, the WIMOB
does not capture the connections between individuals without access to the campus WiFi or
someone contacting infectious persons outside the campus. To reflect this risk in our model,
for any day t, Iout(t) describes the probability of infection on day t from a collocation that
is external to the mobility network. We assume that the probability an individual is infected
due to an external source is proportional to the number of cases in the broader community.
Therefore, we model the probability of external infection as a function of confirmed cases
in the surrounding county, e.g, Fulton county, where the Georgia Institute of Technology
(GT) is located [43]. Ct represents the confirmed cases reported by Fulton County where
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Cmax is the maximum number of the cases over the whole period, Iout(t) is given by
Iout(t) = α ∗
Ct
Cmax
where α is a parameter scaling the normalized confirm cases in the surrounding county.
The resulting number of external infections on day t is then modeled to be are Binomial
with |S(t)| trials with probability of success Iout(t).
In summary, for every day t > 0, the overall number of individuals that become newly
exposed is represented as N tS→E which is the result of both external and internal transmis-
sions.





fp(ai, t, p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
internal transmissions
Model dynamics after exposure
After exposure, individuals in the model will progress through other disease states in our
model. We update the number of individuals in each state daily to reflect transitions be-
tween them. The transitions between the states on day t are summarized according to the
following equations:
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S(t+ 1)− S(t) = −N tS→E
E(t+ 1)− E(t) = N tS→E −N tE→Asym −N tE→Sym
Asym(t+ 1)− Asym(t) = N tE→Asym −N tAsym→R
Sym(t+ 1)− Sym(t) = N tE→Sym −N tSym→I
I(t+ 1)− I(t) = N tSym→I −NI→D −NI→R
R(t+ 1)−R(t) = NI→R
D(t+ 1)−D(t) = NI→D
After an individual has been exposed, they will spend ∆S days in an incubation period.
At day ∆S after their exposure, individuals will become a symptomatic infection with prob-
ability pS . Otherwise the agent will become an asymptomatic infection This process is
given by the following two equations:
N tE→Sym ∼





|E(t−∆S)| −N tE→Sym, t ≥ ∆S
0, otherwise
Individuals who enter the asymptomatic state will recover after ∆Asym→R days since they
were first exposed. Thus, we represent the number of transitions from asymptomatic to






E→Asym , t ≥ ∆Asym→R
0, otherwise
On the other hand, individuals who enter the symptomatic will eventually enter the isola-
tion state [32]. The time that individuals spend in the symptomatic state before entering the
isolated state is normally distributed δtI ∼ Normal(∆I , σ2I ). We simulate each individual’s
transition between symptomatic and isolated by using a sampling function Γ(ai, t,∆t) and









first day of ai entering exposed, ai ∈ Sym(t)
+∞, otherwise
The aggregated transitions N tSym→I between symptomatic and isolated is the sum of the







Individuals who enter the isolated state may end up with one of two states: dead or
recovered. We defined N tI→D as following another binomial distribution with parameter
pD:
N tI→D ∼ Binomial(|I(t)|, pD)














Figure 2.2: (a) The schematic of the compartments in our modified SEIR model. By the
design of the GT surveillance testing [40, 49], the total testable population is defined as
the summation of susceptible, exposed, and asymptomatic. Infectious persons are in either
symptomatic or symptomatic. For every effective edge in the mobility network, a suscep-
tible individual that is exposed to an infectious person becomes infected with probability
p. Individuals may also get infected due to an exposure not captured by the WIMOB net-
work which occurs with probability Iout(t) on day t. account for new infected cases. (b)
The mobility behavior represented by WIMOB changes every day of the semester (shown
weekly here). The contact network constructed from WIMOB forms the underlying contact
structure of the NABM.
symptomatic and isolation except δtR ∼ Normal(∆R, σ2R) where ∆R and σR are the two
parameters standing for the mean and standard deviation of days for an individual in the








Most of our model parameters can be estimated from previous studies (see Table 2.1).
However, three parameters in our study are not easily estimated from previous studies: (1)
the proportion of the agents that begin the semester asymptotically infected, I0, (2) the
probability of transmission between a given infectious individual and susceptible individ-
ual given a contact in the mobility network, p, and (3) the scaling factor α used to determine
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probability of transmission due to contact outside of WIMOB network on day t, Iout(t) (see
(section 2.5)). We fit these three parameters to the published weekly positivity rate (per-
centage of asymptomatic cases) as reported byUIUC, Berkeley, and GT’s asymptomatic
surveillance testing program [40, 42, 41]. To fit the parameters, we performed calibration
to minimize the root mean square of error(r.m.s.e) between the simulation estimates of the
weekly positivity rate and the observed weekly positivity rate on ,UIUC, Berkeley, and
GT’s campus of the Fall 2020 semester as reported by each surveillance testing program.
To perform the calibration, we used two sets of public data pertaining to 2020 Fall
semester at each school: (i) the confirmed cases in the school’s counties [43, 45, 44],
and (ii) the aggregated surveillance test positivity rate for each week [40, 41, 42]. The
former helps estimate the daily external infection percentage. The latter is the ground truth
trajectory we fit our model on. We consider the data aggregated by week because each
individual on campus can only get tested once per week. The positivity rate provided by
the surveillance testing data can be interpreted as the estimated percentage of new asymp-
tomatic cases out of the total testable population which includes susceptible, exposed, and
asymptomatic — with an assumption that every testable population get tested at the same
rate.
To formalize the calibration problem, letRw be the surveillance-testing aggregated result
at week w. Let S(I0, α, p, w) be the function of the simulation model which returns the
percentage of new asymptomatic in week w out of the total testable population. For every
combination of parameters, the predicted result for each week w is estimated by taking the
average of N simulation outputs. The objective function is:















Table 2.1: Model Parameters of the NABM on GT
Parameter Definition Value Std Source
p Transmission probability: For any edge between a suscep-
tible and infectious individual in the contact network, p is
the probability that the susceptible person will enter into
the exposed state. This only dictates internal transmission
0.034 0.007 Calibration
α Scaling factor of the normalized confirmed cases in the sur-
rounding county((section 2.5)). This is the parameter for us
to generate Iout(t)
0.032 0.0032 Calibration
I0 Proportion of population that is asymptomatic at day 0 0.012 0.0009 Calibration
pS Probability of exposed persons becoming symptomatic 0.66 - [32]
∆S Incubation period (days) since the first day of exposure 5 - [32]
∆Asym→R Asymptomatic duration (days); it is the time taken for an
asymptomatic person to recover since the first day of expo-
sure
7 - [32]
∆I , σI Time of an symptomatic entering isolated since the first day
of exposure of a symptomatic person
8 2 [51]
∆R, σR Time for recovery for a symptomatic, since the first day of
exposure
12 2 [10]
pD Death rate under isolated 0.0006 - [10]
We fit our model to the first 5 weeks of Fall 2020 and validate the results on the remaining
weeks. After obtaining the optimal set of parameters, for robust comparison of policies with
different viral variants, we generate a range of parameters by compromising the r.m.s.e
within 40% of the minima [33]. First, we implement the Nelder Mead method [50] to
discover the optimal set of parameters that minimizes the r.m.s.e. Next, we sample 40
different combinations of parameters within 40% of the minimum r.m.s.e to estimate the
means and standard deviations of these parameters ( Table 2.1). Throughout this paper,
we pool together all simulation results across those parameters over multiple runs (N =
15) and report the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the simulation outputs for every policy




We split the available dataset in the Fall semester of 2020 into a training set described in
the previous section (the first five weeks since 08/17/2020) and a test set (the remaining 12
weeks). We then validate the model by comparing simulation results with the surveillance
data reported not used for calibration in different campuses in the Fall semester of 2020,
the asymptomatic percentages of the total testable population. Note that the evaluated
NABMs use only the optimal parameter set (not the 40% approximation set for quantifying
uncertainty). We keep running the models after the fifth week of the semester. As seen in
Figure 2.3, for the NABM in every campus, the simulation results after the first five weeks
follow patterns fairly close to the ground truth with a 2-3 weeks delay and overestimation
in general.
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(a) External cases: GT












(b) Calibrating on the weeks 0-4: GT







(c) External cases: UIUC












(d) Calibrating on the weeks 0-4: UIUC








(e) External cases: Berkeley













(f) Calibrating on the weeks 0-4: Berkeley
Figure 2.3: Calibration and Validation Results
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CHAPTER 3
POLICY DESIGN AND EVALUATION
3.1 Overview
Infectious diseases can cause devastating impacts on university campuses. The respiratory
infectious disease that appeared in 2020, Covid-19, is indeed challenging universities in
the world. In the U.S., more than half a million cases have been identified at universities
[3]. As the global pandemic continuously spreading throughout the country, it is common
for school officials to adapt non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI) such as the closure of
locations to control on-campus infections [52]. These operation strategies typically rely on
remote instruction (RI) to maintain educational activities without using campus-spaces [53,
54, 55]. Recent studies tell us that policy-makers can leverage course-enrollment (Course
enrollment data (EN)) data to design RI policies: move classes with many attendants to
online mode [19, 17]. Since the national lockdown, 44% of the colleges and universi-
ties in the U.S. have implemented RI [56]. Nevertheless, these policies have side effects
by forcing too many students into a completely remote schedule [57]. For example, stu-
dents’ learning outcomes might be worse due to losing months of education, which might
affect their future careers [58]. Besides, the economy of universities and their surrounding
neighborhood might go down if the campus population is small [6, 7].Furthermore, with
socioeconomic disparities and heterogeneous household contexts, the demands of remote
instruction can lead to added anxiety and stress among students [59, 60]. Therefore, relying
on RI is an inappropriate approach for the universities to balance community health with
the demand for education, social economy, and wellbeing. A more versatile and robust ap-
proach is in need such that policy-makers have a good assessment of closure’s side-effect
while conceiving policies for minimizing the risk of future outbreaks.
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3.2 Contribution
We propose a new method to design and experiment with novel closure policies in a uni-
versity campus setting by utilizing WIMOB from the campus’s WiFi infrastructure. First,
WIMOB involves constructing anonymized mobility networks that inform an extended pe-
riod of collocation or ”proximate contact” between individuals to depict the real contact
networks. One predominant nature of WIMOB is that it enables closure policies at the
granularity level of rooms, halls, or suites. We define our closure policies equipped with
the WiFi-based mobility data as localized closure LC. Second, WIMOB utilizes the data
collected over 2019 and 2020 of approximately 40,000 anonymous occupants and visitors
of the Georgia Institute of Technology, a large urban campus in the U.S. - including about
16,000 undergraduate students, 9,000 graduate students, and 7,600 staff members. Third,
WIMOB is further used to design and analysis of LC. We evaluate the performance of LC in
comparison to RI based on an NABM model with WIMOB as the contact-networks among
agents. The model is calibrated with GT on-campus Covid-19 cases from the fall semester
of 2020 and Fulton County’s infection rates. To compare the effectiveness of interventions,
we describe a counterfactual semester unaltered by other policy-induced behaviors of 2020
by leveraging WIMOB from fall 2019 to determine the simulation’s contact structure. This
study’s designed experiments aim to assess RI and LC’s performance metrics related to
disease size and burdens under different behavioral scenarios.
As a result, we find that LC is comparable to RI in controlling total infections but more
effective at reducing peak infections and internal transmission. Concerning the burdens
to campus and individuals, LC targets fewer locations and forces fewer students into fully
online mode, and does not isolate any more people than IC. In general, WIMOB can assist
universities in devising highly-specific closure policies, like LC, which can simultaneously
contain the spread of disease and mitigate campus disruption compared to RI.
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3.3 Policy Design
RI: Offering Large Classes Online
As a response to Covid-19, prior work has recommended using EN to enforce a form of
RI— moving classes large to an online remote instruction setup while other classes are
offered in–person [18, 19, 17]. While we have access to aggregate insights on EN contact
networks, our study protocol prohibits us from accessing course-specific information at an
individual level. Therefore to infer individual enrollment, we analyze the edges of the bi-
partite graph K. For this, we first scrape the GT’s course roster for Fall 2019 (filtered to
only represent the Atlanta campus). This process provides us with a location and weekly
schedule for every lecture conducted on campus, including its various sections. With this
information, we are able to identify which edges represent visits to lectures, and subse-
quently, we can account for unique visitors to a lecture. Thus, we can first identify the
number of unique individuals on campus who are enrolled in classes. The aggregate data
from course enrollment reports that 21, 299 students were enrolled in Fall 2019. In com-
parison, our inference identifies 22, 248 students. The excess number can be explained by
the fact that our method does not distinguish between instructors, TAs, and students. Next,
we study the unique visitors to every lecture in the scraped course schedule which gives us
an estimate for the size of every class. Given the limitations of our data processing, actual
enrollment sizes could be larger, but our process is less likely to count false positives [38].
Finally, to model RI, for the contact network Gt, we create a counterfactual network G′t for
each day t. These exclude collocations that took place at lecture locations during lecture
times. If two people were connected solely by proximity during lectures — in a class with
large enrollment — they will appear disconnected in the counterfactual network.
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LC: Closing Important Locations
This article demonstrates the effectiveness of localized closures,LC, which are targeted
interventions to seize mobility at different spaces on campus. For this, we identify im-
portant locations on campus by analyzing H . In the main paper, LC uses PageRank [61]
as an illustrative algorithm to identify important location nodes. For robustness, we apply
various additional algorithms to identify highly authoritative nodes in H — betweenness
centrality [62], eigenvector centrality [63], and load centrality [64]. In the SI Appendix, we
distinguish these different policies as Localized closure policies with Pagerank (LCPRank),
Localized closure policies with Betweenness Centrality (LCBCen), Localized closure poli-
cies with Eigenvector Centrality (LCECen), Localized closure policies with Load Centrality
(LCLCen). Since RI captures a weekly schedule to determine enrollment, LC is implemented
to find locations based on behavior from the past 7 days of mobility. We apply the weighted
version of the algorithms mentioned earlier on the directed graph representing movement,
H . The edge weight is based on the number of instances of movement between any Li
and Lj . After sorting the locations by importance, we determine the number of locations
to shut down based on different budgets induced by RI— mobility and risk of exposure.
For this purpose, we take the approach of a greedy algorithm which successively removes
highly-ranked locations till the constraint is met (within 1% margin of error). Similar to RI,
LC also render counterfactual collocation networks, G”t for each day t. In these networks,
we remove instances of collocations that occurred at the shutdown locations.
3.4 Inducing Budgets and Characterizing Behavioral Scenarios
We now describe how we compare the RI and LC policies. First, we consider the effects
of these policies under three behavioral scenarios. These scenarios express the spillover
effects of closure that lead to students avoiding campus entirely because their entire sched-
ule is forced online. This analysis assumes that the motivation to be present on campus
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is determined primarily by enrollment. We consider that, if a student has a full course
load (enrolled in a minimum of 3 classes) and all their classes are offered online, that
student might have less incentive to visit campus at all (for any engagement) and thus prac-
tice Avoidance. Since LC could end up closing classrooms, it can also lead to academic
schedules being affected and elicit Avoidance behavior. As a result, we describe three sce-
narios. Persistent Scenario (S1 ), is the preliminary, or null scenario, which represents no
Avoidance. This counterfactual collocation graph only removes edges directly affected by
RI or LC. The second scenario we model is Non-residential Avoidance (S2 ) where only
non-residential students with full online schedules stop visiting campus entirely. Here the
counterfactual graph will remove all edges of non-residential students with fully online
schedules. Lastly, the third scenario we model is Complete Avoidance (S3 ) where any
student with fully online schedules stops activity on campus entirely (including residential
students). Here the counterfactual graph will remove all edges from any student with fully
online schedules. Since our study protocol prohibits us from mapping our data to other
sources, we heuristically infer which individuals are likely to be residential and which are
not. We label individuals as residential when they dwell an average of at least 15 minutes
at residential locations between 6pm and 10am, on workdays (Monday–Thursday).
Under each scenario, we limit the number of locations that can be closed under the LC
policy to ensure the level of restriction is constrained to be similar to the RI policy. We limit
the number of locations under two types of restrictive budgets. The first budget is based on
mobility, which is the percentage of edges remaining in the bipartite graph if a policy were
to be implemented. The second budget is based on exposure risk, which is the number of
unique individuals who would be in the 1-hop collocation neighborhood of positive indi-
viduals. We compute this budget by randomly sampling 2.5% of the population as positive,
based on the highest 7-day average positivity rate reported by GT [49] in Fall 2019. Note,
however, the effect of RI on campus can vary in different behavioral scenarios, thereby
changing the budget available to design a comparable LC policy. For instance, the number
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of people at exposure risk is much lower in S3 . As a result, we build multiple alternate
networks representing the effect of policies under counterfactual behavioral scenarios.
3.5 Outcome Metrics
We present differences between LC and RI based on three infection reduction outcomes;
peak infections (maximum active cases on a given day), internal transmission (exposure
from infected individuals on campus), and total infections (cumulative cases at the end of
the semester). Additionally, we measure the burden of policy interventions with the number
of locations closed — requires resources to monitor and maintain super-spreader locations,
the percentage of students that avoid campus — disruption to learning outcomes [58, 59],
and the percentage of individuals completely isolated — worsens mental wellbeing [65].
3.6 Results
LC cause greater reduction in peak infections, while affecting fewer locations
Controlling peak infections relaxes the burden on a university to support positive cases for
any given day, and allows resources to be distributed over time. In all scenarios, of our
simulation of Fall 2019, we observe that the peak reduction is significantly better in LC
(Table 3.1) than RI. While RI impacts 58 different locations (classrooms and lecture halls),
in S1 and S2 , LC achieves better outcomes by closing fewer locations. For example, in
S2 , RI achieves a 28.9% peak reduction, but LC shows a reductions of 49.3% (mobility
budget) and 48.1% (exposure risk budget). This is attained by closing 38 or 50 locations
respectively. Therefore, with such policies, policymakers need to restrict fewer locations








































S1: Persistence (95.5% Mobility)
S2: Non-Res Avoidance (92.3% Mobility)























Figure 3.1: Results of policy interventions with our calibrated NABM on contact networks
from Fall 2019, derived from WIMOB. This graph compares the mean active infections
between LC and RI. LC show improved outcomes (shaded regions) even when constrained
to the same restrictions of RI policies. (a)–inset: After the first wave, even though LC
shows slightly higher active infections, the cumulative infections are still lower, especially
those that are a result of internal transmission on campus.
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Figure 3.2: Outcomes of policies within the same scenario are shown with boxes of the
same color (RI policies are solid, LC policies are hatched) and box heights represent the
2.5th and 97.5th percentile. In S1 , even though LC and RI are equally burdensome in terms
of students avoiding campus, LC shows improved outcome on peak reductions. In fact, for
the other scenarios, LC shows better outcomes than RI, without forcing as many students
into online schedules, and, therefore, being even less burdensome with greater impact.
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Table 3.1: Comparison of different policies in terms of controlling the disease and impacts on campus in Fall 2019. Within each scenario, we
perform the Kruskal-Wallis H-Test [66] to compare outcomes of LC with RI. We find that LC leads to significantly improved peak infection reduction
and internal transmission. In terms of reduction in total infections, the outcomes are comparable in general but can vary by specific scenarios. In
addition, every policy also exerts some burden on campus, either in terms of locations affected, students avoiding campus or isolation. We observe
that LC policies focus on fewer locations (except in (except in S3 )). Moreover, these policies affect fewer student’s schedules and therefore fewer
people avoid campus due to completely remote schedules. Finally, LC does not increase the percentage of people completely isolated on campus
(p-value: < 0.01:∗, < 0.001:∗∗).
Scenario S1: Persistence S2: Non-Res Avoidance S3: Complete Avoidance



















25.34(±12) 36.92(±14)∗∗ 34.30(±13)∗∗ 35.44(±10) 49.33(±11)∗∗ 52.19(±10)∗∗ 61.62(±7) 69.34(±5)∗∗ 64.44(±6)∗∗
Total Infections
(%)
6.99(±5) 10.63(±6)∗∗ 8.19(±5)∗∗ 14.88(±4) 13.96(±6)∗ 15.67(±6) 33.00(±5) 33.4(±5) 26.94(±5)∗∗
Internal Transmis-
sions (%)




58 18 19 58 38 50 58 192 124
Students Avoiding
(%)




5.42 8.40 8.40 5.95 5.72 5.71 7.09 5.18 5.23
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Table 3.2: Comparison of Contact Network Structure (Fall 2019). We create a contact network of only students with WIMOB and compare it with
insights from contact networks created with EN. On average, we find the contact network constructed with WIMOB shows fewer average contacts,
lower density and higher average shortest path (between reachable paths). Moreover, within WIMOB itself, characterizing all spaces reveals more
contacts and shorter paths than only focusing on contacts in lectures. While the proportion of the largest component appears similar, note that with
WIMOB, on average about only 70% of the students visit campus on a given week. We further inspect the disease–mitigating structural changes of
the RI policy on the network. We observe that the changes across all metrics with EN appear to be more drastic than compared to WIMOB.
Cornell Georgia Tech










22051 21299 15379(±3353) 15379(±3353) 15380(±3353)
Average Contacts 529 22 −
41
341 30 152(±63) 86(±35) 86(±34)
Density 0.024 0.001 0.016 0.001 0.009(±0.002) 0.005(±0.001) 0.0053(±0.0014)
Largest Connected
Component(%)
0.991 0.763 0.994 0.627 0.999(±0.001) 0.999(±0.02) 0.978(±0.025)
Average Shortest
Path
2.47 3.75 2.54 3.54 2.67(±0.28) 3.26(±0.5) 2.953(±0.35)
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LC lead to comparable reduction in total infections, while keeping more students on cam-
pus
Universities want to minimize the number of infected cases while ensuring majority of the
population remains active on campus to continue successful operation. The total number of
infections reduced by both LC and RI are similar. While the differences between policies
are statistically significant (Table 3.2) in some scenarios, the magnitude of these differences
might not be practically as important. In contrast, the impact the policies have on the
student schedules is remarkably different. RI forces multiple students to adapt to fully
online schedules. In the Scenario S2 , 9% of students do not visit campus and in S3 , 27%
of students do not visit campus. On the other hand in LC the number of students expected
to avoid campus can be as low as 0 and never exceeds more than 12%. Besides sustaining
economic loss to the campus, remote instruction can increase anxiety among students and
hinder learning outcomes [59, 60]. Compared to RI, LC offers policymakers a way to
defend against turnover in the student population, without compromising overall control
of disease spread (Table 3.1). Limiting the number of students that avoid campus helps
preserve on-campus businesses [6, 7] and minimally disrupts the student wellbeing.
LC cause greater reduction in internal transmission without causing further isolation on
campus
Universities are responsible for limiting spread on campus, but they must also ensure that
aggressive policies do not worsen mental wellbeing of the community. In terms of inter-
nal transmission the reduction is significantly larger with LC (Table 3.1). However, when
LC restricts the infections early in Fall 2019, it leaves more individuals susceptible to ex-
ternal transmission. College student behavior outside campus on weekends and breaks is
known to impact local transmission [67]. When policymakers consider LC they should also
consider policies on re-entry or required testing based on off-campus activities. In terms of
isolating individuals on campus, it’s notable that LC and RI are similar in S2 . Interestingly,
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in S3 , where LC closes more than 100 locations, the percentage of isolated individuals per
week is less than that of RI. This finding implies that LC can keep individuals on campus
without forcing them into complete isolation. Here “isolation” refers to no form of proxi-
mate contact with any individual on campus — extreme social distancing where individuals
are not even collocated in the same suite or hall. While social distancing is a recommended
countermeasure for COVID-19 [54], complete isolation can have adverse effects on psy-
chological wellbeing [65, 68, 69]. Staying completely isolated on campus can increase
loneliness and limit social connectedness [68], which are both related to depression [65].
Although the proportions are similar (Table 3.1), LC does not necessarily isolate the same
sets of individuals. This qualitative difference could also explain the difference in internal
transmissions — LC could be isolating individuals who are less likely to spread the virus.
LC identifies a wider variety of auxiliary spaces.
By using WIMOB to design LC we are able to identify locations for closure at the granu-
larity level of rooms, including unbound spaces such as lobbies and work areas. First, in
S1 , we find that most locations that LC targets are a subset of the auditoriums–like rooms
where large classes would take place in Fall 2019. Note, LC needs to restrict only a few
such spaces to be under the same budget as RI. This is because, under S1 , RI policies only
alter visits to lectures, while these spaces are used for other purposes during other times
(e.g., club activities and seminars). We also note that LC targets ‘high traffic’ locations
like conference center lobbies which are typically used as waiting areas or for networking
events. Next, in Scenario S2 , we see that in addition to spaces mentioned earlier, interest-
ingly LC further restricts the use of smaller rooms (occupancy 13 − 35) which would not
be affected by RI (as only classes of size ≥ 30 are offered online). LC also targets areas
in the recreation center (which includes locker rooms and indoor courts for 4− 20 people).
This insight indicates that our methodology WIMOB is sensitive to other student activities.
Moreover, we also find a selection of spaces that would not be frequented by the undergrad-
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uate population, such as lab areas and facility buildings like the police station. Lastly, in
Scenario S3 , LC targets closure of activity in far more spaces than RI. However, the better
outcomes can be attributed to the fact that LC diversifies the potential restriction areas. LC
now restricts heavily used small study rooms or breakout rooms (for 1 − 6 people). Fur-
thermore, it restricts use of spaces where multiple small groups of people can organically
assemble, such as cafes, dining halls, and reading areas. We also observe that LC restricts
activity in about 10 Greek Houses but does not target other housing areas — demonstrating
its ability to restrict social behavior that could amplify disease spread. Figure A.17 shows
the diversity in locations for various LC policies.
3.7 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we design complementary experiments to inspect the robustness LC policies
under different setups and calibration approaches. These variations are defined as follows:
• Calibration periods (V1): For the results in the main paper, we discuss results with
our NABM calibrated on the first 5 weeks of surveillance testing data. For addi-
tional analyses, the model parameters are re-estimated based on the surveillance data
from week 5− 9 and 10− 14 in Fall 2020 at GT. The calibration is validated on the
remaining weeks in the semester. Figure A.1 shows the calibration and validation.
The results of policy comparison with these variations can be found in Table A.6 and
Table A.7, for weeks 5− 9 and 10− 14 respectively. Additionally, Figure A.7 shows
boxplots to compare the distributions of different policies, while Figure A.13 and
Figure A.14 show cumulative plots of the disease control outcomes, for weeks 5− 9
and 10− 14 respectively.
• Campuses and counties (V2): For the results in the main paper, the calibration of our
NABM reflects certain latent factors inherent to GT that could affect both mobility
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behavior as well as testing results. To complement this we consider calibrating our
data under different settings informed by surveillance testing from other similar large
universities. This analysis is intended to represent the GT community in a different
geographic setting, which is influenced by a different surrounding community, poli-
cies and resources. The new parameters are estimated based on the first 5 weeks
of surveillance testing from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC)
and the University of California, Berkeley (Berkeley) [41, 42], and the correspond-
ing county data uidphcv19, acdphcv19 The calibration is validated on the remaining
weeks in the semester. Figure A.2 and Figure A.3 show the calibration and valida-
tion for UIUC and Berkeley respectively. The results of policy comparison with these
variations can be found in Table A.8 and Table A.9. Additionally, Figure A.8 shows
boxplots to compare the distributions of different policies, while Figure A.15 and
Figure A.16 show cumulative plots of the disease control outcomes.
The estimated parameters with these calibration variations are described in Table A.1.
Both RI and LC are evaluated in the same infection reduction metrics and burden metrics
again under scenarios S1, S2, and S3. Since the budgets are structural (mobility, and expo-
sure risk) the LC policies are unchanged among the variants. Moreover, since the burden
metrics are structural, those results are invariant.
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CHAPTER 4
RECONSTRUCT AN EPIDEMIC OVER TIME
4.1 Overview
Universities might want to know who the outbreak sources are and how the disease trans-
mits when the disease spread out on campus for some time. In particular, they are interested
in reconstructing the epidemic by discovering the sources and flows causing the outbreak
among individuals on university campuses. By doing so, universities can identify groups of
individuals and locations at risk, they can prioritize testing for people, or they can discover
people who have been likely infected but not captured by testing.
Surprisingly, we found that no current studies have targeted this question on univer-
sity campuses specifically. Methodologically, identifying the sources and chains of trans-
missions from an epidemiological network falls into reverse engineering problems with
existing efficient algorithms for solving them [70, 71, 72, 21]. However, the problem
formulations in these studies typically have rigorous requirements on the input data and
infection model. For example, they might expect perfect testing on individuals without
false-positive cases and missing infections [70, 71]. Some of them assume the infection
models are a susceptible-infections (SI) model or an independent cascade (IC) model [72,
71]. Moreover, an epidemiological network is already given to us as well.
Our main challenges to address are two: (1) We need to construct a network that can ap-
proximate the real-world contact network among the population on campus. (2) We should
start with a formulation that works for the data available from real-world campuses. First,
related studies highlight the use of course enrollment data to proximate network relations
among individuals [19, 17]. Still, it inherently has limitations describing the population
dynamics because it excludes the outside-class room’s activities. Instead, we propose us-
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ing the collocations network from WIMOB as demonstrated in Figure 2.1. Second, we are
prohibited from using data reporting which specific individual is positive due to privacy
concerns. The lowest granularity level data available to us is the number of positivities
within a group of individuals which can be noisy in general [49]. Therefore, the expected
problem formulation will need to reflect this uncertainty over the group-level data.
4.2 Contributions
We formulate the problem of reconstructing the epidemic given WIMOB and the report of
positivity among groups of individuals to discover the sources and flows causing the out-
break on university campuses. The formulation leverages an existing work, and the inputs
are similar to the real-world data available to us: (1) a time-varying collocation network
and (2) a noised surveillance data reporting the number of positive cases for groups. In
particular, we introduce a sampling procedure to convert the group’s data into individual-
based reports so that our problem can solved by calling an existing algorithm multiple
times. Then, we validate the entire framework by instances from the calibrated NABM we
have designed in previous chapters. Last, we present the result of a case study using the
real-world data at GT in Fall 2020 semester under the Covid-19 pandemic.
4.3 Preliminaries
Let F be the set of global nodes. Let G = (V,E) to be a temporal network [73]. A
temporal network consists of a set of nodes V = {(u, t)|u ∈ F, t ∈ N} where each (u, t)
is a time-stamped copy of u ∈ F . A temporal network also consists of a set of edges
E = {(u, v, t)|u, v ∈ F, t ∈ N} where each (u, v, t) means there is a edge pointing from
u to v at day t. Let w : E → R+ be the weight of edges E. A temporal path P between
two time-stamps nodes (u, ts) and (v, te) is a sequence of node-disjoint edges (u,w1, t1),
(w1, w2, t2), (w2, w3, t3) ... (wj−1, v, tj) such that ts ≤ t1, tj ≤ te, and ti ≤ ti+1 for all
1 ≤ i ≤ j − 1.
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We use the term R to denote a individual-based report data in a schema of {u, t}, which
is a subset of V . Also let J1, J1, ...Jk denote groups (subsets) of F . Let D = {Ji, ci, t}
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and t ∈ N be the group-based report data, where ci,t is the number of
positivity found in group Ji at time t. The latest time-stamp is denoted by T .
Let P = {P1,P2, ...Pl} be a set of temporal paths. We say that P spans a subset of V ,
denoted by X , if and only if every (u, t′) ∈ X comes after corresponding (u, t) covered in
P , i.e. t′ ≥ t.
Given a set of temporal paths P , a node u ∈ F is called a seed if there exists a (u, t)
covered by P , and there is no edges (v, u, t) ∈ Pi for any Pi ∈ P . The set of seeds of a set
of temporal path P is denoted by S(P ).
4.4 Problem Formulation
4.4.1 Literature Review
The collocation network collected from the WiFi infrastructure is a temporal network. We
first give a review of prior works for solving problems similar to our purpose. Shah and
Zaman formalize the notion of rumor centrality for discovering a single source causing an
epidemic under a SI model with a practical algorithm for attaining optimal solutions for
d-level trees [70]. Lappas et al. formulate the problem of identifying k seed nodes, or
effectors of a partially activated network, in steady-state under the IC model [71]. Both
of these two formulations have strict assumptions over the number of seeds to be iden-
tified. Aditya and Sundareisan present another two formulations in terms of Minimum
Description Length under the SI model, which can automatically determine the number of
sources in the solution and allows false-positive reports within the current infection snap-
shot [72, 74]. However, these problem formulations do not fit our expectations because




There is one formulation for the problem with assuming a temporal network and an ar-
bitrary infection model [75]. We present the preliminary formulation of the problem as
follows:
Problem TempSteinerTree: Given a temporal network G = (V,E), an individual-based
report R, a candidate set C, which is a subset of F , and a source size k, find a set of tem-
poral paths P in order to minimize the sum of distance
∑
e∈P w(e). subject to:
(i) P spans R
(ii) S(P ) ⊂ C
(iii) |S(P )| ≤ k
The formulation adapts the idea of ”shorter is more likely” so that it does not requires
us to model the likelihood of the temporal paths based on the infection models. Besides,
R can include missing infections. The output forest will automatically discover likely
missing infections within the infection cascade from the input data. Polina et al. show that
an instance of TempSteinerTree can be transformed into a instance of Minimum Directed
Steiner Tree problem [76], a well-known NP-hard graph theory problem in history [75].
4.4.3 Sampling Procedure
However, as said we are prohibited from using data reporting which specific individual is
positive due to privacy concerns from IRB. The data available to us is D, the number of
positive cases in each group at each time-stamp. We consider using a sampling procedure
f : D → R by converting D into an instance of R. The sampling produce f for single
group i’s report Di at any time t is defined in detail as follows:
f(Di, t) = sample(Ji,t, ci,t)
43
Ji,t+1 = Ji,t \ f(Di, t)
We set initialization Ji,0 = Ji. Note that sample(X,n) is a function that randomly selects an
element by a uniform distribution in each step and eventually returns a subsetH ⊂ X , such
that |H| = n. The recurrence within f indicates a sampling procedure without replacement
for each group Ji.
4.4.4 Group-level-Influence
By introducing the sample procedure, we are able to formulate our problem and name it as
Group-level-influence.
Problem: Group-level-influence Given a temporal network G = (V,E), an group-based
report R = f(D), a candidate set C, which is a subset of F , and a source size k, find a set




(i) P spans R
(ii) S(P ) ⊂ C
(iii) |S(P )| ≤ k
4.5 Solving Group-level-influence
Solving Group-level-influence involves solving the TempSteinerTree problem. The key
idea for solving TempSteinerTree is to transform the temporal network into a static net-
work and apply the best approximation algorithm for Minimum Directed Steiner Tree
[75]. Charikar et al. designed an p(p − 1)s
1
p approximation algorithm which recursively
constructs a p-level trees by merging sub-trees with the lowest marginal normalized dis-
tance [76]. In particular for an p = 2 case, the transformation for the temporal network
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G = (V,E) allows us to accelerate the algorithm by reducing the solution space from the
shortest paths between all pairs of nodes to global shortest paths between C and a single
time stamped copy (u, t) for each u ∈ F . Here we present the accelerated version of the
algorithm, named Cult, in Algorithm 1
Algorithm 1 Cult
1: procedure CULT(G(V,E), F, C,R, α)
2: for z(u) ∈ C and v ∈ F do
3: Calculate global shortest path between the dummy node z(u) and v.
4: Distance: L(z(u), v), Paths: q(z(u), v)
5: T = φ
6: X ← the nodes in F covered by R




9: for z(u) ∈ C do
10: T1 = φ, cost = α, profit = 0
11: for v ∈ X in an ascending order of L(z(u), v) do
12: T1 = T1 ∪ q(z(u), v)
13: cost+ = L(z(u), v)
14: profit+ = 1









18: T = T ∪ T ′1
19: X\ nodes covered by T ′1
20: return T
α is a parameter for controlling the size of the source S(T ). Note that we omit the calcula-
tion for the global shortest paths and the construction of dummy nodes for each candidate
u ∈ C. Please refer to the original paper for the pseudo code in detail [75]. Algorithm 1’s
time complexity is O(|C||E|).
Proposition 1: We can attain a solution for Group-level-influence by calling Cult W
times and each time there is a new sample from Ri = f(D). We then merge the results
T1, T2..., TW to have a new forest T ∗.
We propose the algorithm, Cult-sampling, based on Proposition 1. The pseudo code is
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presented in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Cult-sampling
1: procedure CULT(G(V,E), F, C,D, α,W )
2: T ∗ = φ
3: for i = 1, 2, 3...W do
4: Ri = f(D)
5: Ti = Cult(G(V,E), F, F,Ri, α)
6: T ∗ = Merge(T ∗, Ti)
7: return T ∗
In particular, we set the input candidate set C to be the global nodes F (i.e. everyone is a
source candidate). Currently, we have not finalized the Merge() function yet for aggregat-
ing the forests from each sampling to form a new forest. We propose using dominator-tree
[77, 78], which will be presented in our future publications.
4.6 Validation
In this section, we first validate Cult with the real-world data WIMOB and the NABM de-
signed in chapter 1 Figure 2.2. Since we do not have an access to individual-based reports,
we can only measure the performance based on simulated data attained from running the
calibrated model.
Let Ψ denote the NABM model, let ξ denote the optimal set of parameters after calibrat-
ing the model to the surveillance data in any campus defined in Chapter 1. The return of Ψ
is a forest indicating the ground truth infection cascade in the same schema of the return of
Cult. We use perturb(Y, γ) to simulate the real-world individual-based report concerning
the rate of false negative for any disease testing. perturb(Y, γ) will randomly remove γ %
of the nodes in the forest Y . The pseudo code for validating Cult with our data is presented
in Algorithm 3:
The Metric(Y1, Y2) function is for measuring the similarity between two sets Y1 and Y2. For
instance, we can use Jaccard coefficient over the nodes covered by the two forests [79].
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Algorithm 3 Cult-validation
1: procedure CULT(G(V,E), F, C,D, α,Ψ, ξ, γ)
2: M = φ
3: for i = 1, 2, 3...W do
4: Xi = Ψ(ξ)
5: Si = perturb(Xi, γ)
6: Ti = Cult(G(V,E), F, F, Si, α)
7: M ∪Metric(Xi, Ti)
8: return M
At this time, we have not completed the whole validation for Cult-sampling yet, we will
present the entire setup of validation for Cult-sampling in our future publications.
4.7 A Case Study: GT
In this section, we will implement Algorithm 2 over the group-based testing data for Covid-
19 given to us at GT campus in Fall 2020 semester. In particular, each group in this case is
defined as a collection of students living in the same residence or fraternity building.
4.7.1 Residential Groups’ Report
In the fall semester of 2020, the team conducting the surveillance testing program at GT was
working closely with the campus officials to monitor an outbreak of Covid-19 that appeared
among residential students [49]. For simplification, we select a week when surveillance
testing program finally identified 25 cases among all residential groups, including frater-
nity houses, from 10/24/2020 to 10/30/2020 on campus. The report shows the number of
positive cases for each residence building or fraternity hall every day.
4.7.2 Residential Individuals
Since the original WIMOB data is anonymized, we can only infer residential individuals
from the network based on a designed rule. We first explore all active users among the
bipartite network from the move-in week of all residential students, from 08/14/2020 to
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08/20/2020. Note that we define residential groups based on the IDs of all residence halls
and fraternity houses. Second, we set up the rule as follows: anyone staying in any res-
idence hall or fraternity house with the most prolonged duration greater than 60 minutes
from 6 pm to 10 am of the next day of any working day is an inferred resident within the
residential group corresponding to this building. In particular, we define the working days
here as a week without the weekend and Friday. Our analysis finally identifies about 6800
residential students, and among them, about 1200 living in fraternity houses in the Fall
2020 semester.
4.7.3 Setup
We have selected the input D and J1, J2...Jn based on our data. We are also given the
collocation network G = (V,E) from 08/14/2020 to 08/20/2020. Moreover, to start with a
source size k = 3 which is the total reported cases in 08/13/2020, we set α = 50. To respect
on individual’s privacy, instead of showing the individual’s infection cascade as outputted
by Algorithm 2, we only visualize the most frequent (top 15) cross-groups transmissions
from the forests T1, T2, ..., TW .
4.7.4 Result
Our experiment finally identifies 80 ± 7 cases. Among them, 25 cases have been reported
by the data given to us. About 70% of the nodes in each infection cascade are missed by
the surveillance testing at GT.
Note that all residence and fraternity buildings are distributed exactly on the geographical
locations based on the campus map in the following plots. Figure 4.1 shows that the disease
transmits between buildings at the lower right corner on campus on 10/24/2020. Then, on
the second day of the week, it reached the upper left corner of the campus Figure 4.2.
On 10/27/2020, all the building in the upper left corner had been source of transmissions
Figure 4.4. On 10/28/2020 and 10/29/2020, Friday and Saturday, the disease was brought
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Figure 4.1: 10/24/2020, ”nonre” is the group for all non-residential individuals












CONCLUSION, DISCUSSION, AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Conclusion
In the long run, universities worldwide need to find a way to operate safely during an infec-
tious disease epidemic. For instance, when the Covid-19 emerged on campus, universities
sought to design and improve nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPI) strategies to mini-
mize the size of a potential outbreak. In addition, they might want to know what the chains
of transmissions and sources are causing the current infection. Answer these questions
typically requires disease modeling since models help abstract the disease dynamics and
reason more about the mechanism of disease transmission among campus communities.
However, most current modeling works on university campuses rely on aggregated data,
such as Course enrollment data (EN) or testing statistics [17, 10, 11, 12]. However, EN
is static in general, with a limited scope of information given from registration data only
among students and updated non-frequently. Therefore, EN cannot describe the real-world
population dynamics on campus. Besides, surveillance testing on campus can be noisy due
to sampling bias and false-negative rates [49]. The policies yielded by the disease mod-
els using only the aggregated data are considered both inaccurate and burdensome to both
individuals and universities.
We propose using the on-campus managed WiFi to proximate human mobility for dis-
ease modeling and policy design and evaluation. We demonstrate that WiFi Mobility
(WIMOB) can assist universities in designing and evaluating strategies for controlling in-
fections on campus. In particular, using WIMOB to approximates the contact network
among individuals, we construct and validate a network-based simulation model of Covid-
19 on a university campus. Then, we design and evaluate two novel methods for improving
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decision-making powered by the WiFi mobility data with the model constructed. The first
method outputs a more granular and localized closure policy, which is more effective in
terms of disease intervention outcomes and less burdensome to individuals and schools.
The second method can reliably reconstruct likely chains of transmissions over time, given
the current noisy testing statics.
5.1.1 Policy Design and Evaluation
NPI are the first line of defense for universities to respond to contagious diseases like
COVID-19 [80, 81], and are also crucial to control infections and continue operations till
recovery. On a campus, a common form of NPI is closure [82]. Universities consider
EN to design remote instruction (remote instruction policies (RI)) for closure to support
continued operations safely [17]. However, EN can misconstrue contact on campus and
RI policies can have broad impacts despite their effects on curbing the disease spread.
This chapter demonstrates that repurposing logs from a managed WiFi network (WIMOB)
can help design effective localized closure policies (Localized closure policy (LC)). We
simulate COVID-19 with an network agent-based Models (NABM) that harnesses WIMOB
to compare RI and LC. As universities plan for Fall 2021, our results present evidence
that LC can lead to improved infection reduction outcomes, while simultaneously relaxing
burdens on the campus caused by coarse-grained broad RI policies.
5.1.2 Reconstruct An Epidemic over Time
Universities are interested in reconstructing the epidemic by discovering the sources and
flows causing the outbreak among individuals on campuses, given noisy testing data. Ex-
isting studies have already presented various formulations and corresponding efficient al-
gorithms which guarantee good approximation to the optimal solution [72, 74, 71, 70].
However, we realize that these formulations are far from reality considering the input data
given to us. We propose a formulation Group-level-influence that leverages existing work
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[75]. The inputs are similar to the real-world data available: (1) a time-varying collo-
cation network and (2) a noised surveillance data reporting the number of positive cases
for groups. In particular, we introduce Algorithm 2, a sampling procedure to convert the
group’s data into individual-based reports to solve our problem by calling an existing algo-
rithm multiple times. We also design a process to validate Algorithm 1 with our WIMOB
and NABM. Lastly, we present a case study over the group-based data of Covid-19 on
residential groups at Georgia Institute of Technology (GT) in Fall 2020 semester.
5.2 Discussion
5.2.1 WIMOB Data
Operational Considerations: Beyond university campuses, any public institutes, such as
airports, companies, or hospitals, can devise practical methods of obtaining, storing, and
processing mobility of the community as WIMOB. Information teams can access logs from
the managed network internally as it is passively collected. Moreover, it does not require
any new form of surveillance sensing, but administrators must revise terms of use and stay
sensitive to community perspectives. Despite population mobility being valuable for many
applications [83], accumulating localization data can be a significant privacy concern [84].
Instead, operational applications need to conceive approaches that only retain insights on
locations to shutdown but not individual data. Similarly, any practical use needs to have
pre-established access limitations on what stakeholders can learn from the data [85] (e.g.,
decision-makers can only get a list of candidate locations to close).
Privacy, Ethics and Legal Considerations: We purposefully compare our prototype tar-
geted policies against moving classes online because of practical budgets within the uni-
versity. Both the WIMOB and EN based contact networks are derived from archival data
accumulated by universities. This does not require instrumenting campus or its community
with any new form of surveillance infrastructure. However, its use for a different purpose
demands approval by an IRB. Moreover, acquiring these kinds of data would require col-
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laborating with data-stewards (e.g., the IT department) to establish a data-use agreement.
This document must clarify how the data will be de-identified, transferred, and stored.
For this form of data, the critical privacy challenge might not be localization itself, but
rather the aggregation of data over a period of time [84]. Data spanning a longer period
are more susceptible to cross-analyzing and identifying. To mitigate over-accumulation of
data, we suggest an adherence to principles of data minimization [86]. Instead of storing
entire mobility graphs, the campus can compute and preserve only high-level insights, such
as the importance of locations. This redacts any underlying individual behavior and cor-
responding identifiable information. Actually, for future purposes campuses can consider
a form of differential privacy that authorizes limited forms of data querying depending on
the privileges of the stakeholder [85].
An operational application would require the university to update the terms of use for
its managed network. Particularly, the university should disclose how this data can be
used in critical circumstances that invoke shared vulnerabilities [87]. On notifying the
campus community of this change it offers individuals the choice to refrain from using the
university network. Prior work on a sample within the same university campus shows that
90% of students are connected to the network on any given day [38]. Therefore, proposing
such an opt-out condition can be viewed as an unfair choice. As a result, the campus needs
to develop a contingency plan to accommodate network access to users who do not want
their mobility behavior to constitute the aggregated insights.
5.2.2 Policy Making
Recommendations for Campus Administrators (i) Policymakers should pay attention to
academic and student services spaces under an epidemic. Recall that in Chapter 3, we have
illustrated that LC shuts down fewer locations on campus and identifies a wider variety of
auxiliary spaces, see Figure A.17 and Figure A.18. An observation is that WIMOB not
only target sites at the level of rooms, suites, or labs but also give insights into the closed
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locations. In all scenarios and budgets, both RI and LC mostly shut down academic and
student-service spaces. Irrespective of the percentage of these areas, other dimensionalities
might also explain why shutting down these locations. For example, the topology of rooms,
air condition, and schedules might contribute to novel epidemiological findings on campus.
Although this thesis proposes using WIMOB to inform LC, it is flexible for policymakers
to choose any data at the lower granularity but with diverse location types on campuses.
(ii) Contact-tracing teams on campus should use technologies to identify chains of trans-
mission. Current contact-tracing spends a great effort identifying past contacts by survey,
given a positive case, and assign test kits to these individuals [88, 4]. In Chapter 4, we
have seen Algorithm 1 can be applied to discover transmission lines and missing infections
from the testing reports. If individual-based reports are given, the contact-tracing team can
leverage this technique to identify likely missing infections quickly to prioritize them to
the testing service.
Generalizability of Closure Policies for Other Contexts: In practice LC policies
should be deployed on campus in conjunction with the other tools as well like testing,
tracing, and quarantining. WIMOB can complement disease-specific knowledge to iden-
tify closure spaces. For example, small indoor spaces with poor ventilation increase the
risk of infection for COVID-19 [89], while other algorithm-identified locations for closure
might not require closure because mask-wearing and testing have high compliance among
users of that space. Further, as a pandemic progresses and public health guidance devel-
ops [90], with WIMOB, campuses can regulate the restriction of LC policies and anticipate
the path to ‘normal’ operations [91, 92]. Moreover, WIMOB captures various spillover
effects that cannot be captured in methods like EN. For instance, with WIMOB we observe
that the mobility in Fall 2020 was 39% of that in Fall 2019 because the on-ground poli-
cies lead to certain staff working remotely as well. With additional information, WIMOB
enables policymakers to model such scenarios and design alternatives like LC with new
budgets. Policymakers can use WIMOB as a versatile tool to explore dynamic intervention
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strategies as well. Prior work shows that staggering policy restrictions could have variable
impact on campus [93]. Accordingly, WIMOB could be used to build an adaptive version
of LC that updates at different points in the semester based on expected mobility changes.
Additionally, depending on campus priorities and resource limitations, different campuses
can use this same data to model policies differently. The effectiveness of reopening policies
is expected to be sensitive to a campus’ specific context that includes physical infrastruc-
ture, overarching guidelines, and human compliance [94]. For certain campuses policies
might not need to be constrained by exposure risk as testing might be frequent, ubiquitous,
and voluminous. Other campuses could have limits on quarantining capacity. Policymak-
ers might even consider the cost trade-offs by actually forecasting actual financial losses
incurred by reduction in mobility [95], or valuate loss of services based on community
needs [96].
5.3 Limitation and Future Work
This work presents evidence that university campuses can repurpose existing data sources
to inform the design of policies that can control COVID-19. One of the drawbacks of
WIMOB, however, is that it assumes all edges to be the same. For example, when con-
straining by mobility, in real scenarios losing certain visits might be more valuable than
others. Decline in mobility around profit-making services, such as shops and cafeterias,
versus losing mobility at common rooms have a different tangible effects on campus. Cur-
rently, we take an agnostic stance towards the mobility behavior, where all visits at all
locations are the same. In reality, implementing policies could have inequitable qualitative
impacts despite appearing to have a similar network configuration. This can be improved by
embedding more qualitative information into the network and conceiving ingenious ways
to associate costs to edges.
Similar to the assumption that all visits and locations, the current work also assumes
all people to be equal. However, different people have different underlying conditions
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that can make their vulnerabilities more concerning [69]. The privacy safeguards of this
study restricted the research team from acquiring any additional demographic or historical
information. Further work can attempt to characterize the nodes by randomly seeding the
network to reflect the approximate demographic break up of the community. Alternatively,
researchers could try to estimate some demographic based on behavior as well. However,
to leverage accurate individual information, even for operational use during a public health
emergency, policymakers and researchers need to develop new privacy protocols [97].
Also, Chapter 3 only studies three rudimentary scenarios, persistence, non-residential
avoidance, complete avoidance. These scenarios assume that when a location is shutdown,
the individuals who ought to have visited that location do not come into contact with anyone
else during the same time. Yet, other substitution behaviors are possible and the richness of
networks leveraged with WIMOB enables the exploration of various new scenarios that can
be triggered by policy interventions on campus. For instance, individuals might not even
visit transitory spaces, such as lobbies or cafes between classes. Certain collocations could
be the consequence of social ties which might never be developed because of a shutdown
(e.g., project teams meeting outside of class). Further research can illuminate the effects of
policies in more specific scenarios by modeling post-intervention behavior more accurately.
Lastly, our work for the validation of Algorithm 2 remains incomplete. Further work





SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS OF CHAPTER 3
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Table A.1: Calibration outcomes with variations. The results in the main paper use variables p, α, and I0 as estimated by calibrating the simulation
model on the first 5 weeks of positivity rates provided by GT surveillance for Fall 2020, while incorporating external cases from Fulton County. For
sensitivity analyses, we perform calibrations on GT data for weeks 5 − 9 and 10 − 14. Additionally, we perform calibrations on first five weeks of
UIUC and Berkeley positivity rate (along with data from their respective county). These parameters were found by validating the NABM on the
remaining weeks of Fall 2020. To assess the basic reproductive number (R0) of our NABM we study the first 4 weeks of the disease. We find the
effective R0 to be higher for Fall 2019 than Fall 2020 as the mobility behaviors between the 2 semesters was vastly different. Note, Fall 2020 exhibits
only 39% of the mobility we observe in Fall 2019. In fact, the NABM is calibrated on Fall 2020, where behavior was subject to pandemic related
closures, but in Fall 2019 the mobility was not hindered by any interventions. Thus, Fall 2019 reflects a counterfactual of Fall 2020 without any
closures.
Calibrating on Positivity Rate at GT Calibrating on Positivity Rate with other University Behavior
Parameter weeks 0− 4 weeks 5− 9 weeks 10− 14 UIUC Berkeley
p 0.034± 0.007 0.073± 0.005 0.0024± 0.0003 0.024± 0.0009 0.041± 0.003
α 0.032± 0.0032 0.0042± 0.0006 0.0159± 0.002 0.0069± 0.0013 0.038± 0.006
I0 0.012± 0.0009 0.00057± 0.00007 0.0030± 0.0007 0.0039± 0.0013 0.0048± 0.0003
Optimal r.m.s.e 0.0034 0.0007 0.0015 0.0028 0.0031
Effective R0 (min - max), Fall
2020
1.15− 1.18 1.17− 2.14 0.33− 0.95 1.12− 1.19 1.24− 1.28
Effective R0 (min - max), Fall
2019
2.87− 5.68 5.15− 12.93 1.27− 1.36 3.35− 5.35 3.32− 7.00
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Table A.2: Comparison of different Localized closure policies with Pagerank (LCPRank) policies in terms of controlling the disease and impacts on
campus in Fall 2019; calibrated from week 0− 4 in Fall 2020 at GT. Note that this table is the same as Table 3.1. We repeat the results here for easier
comparison of LCPRank to other algorithms shown in Table A.3, Table A.4 and Table A.5. Within each scenario, we perform the Kruskal-Wallis
H-Test [66] to compare outcomes of LCPRank with RI. We find that LCPRank leads to significantly improved peak infection reduction and internal
transmission. In terms of reduction in total infections, the outcomes are comparable in general but can vary by specific scenarios. In addition, every
policy also exerts some burden on campus, either in terms of locations affected, students avoiding campus or isolation. We observe that LCPRank
policies focus on fewer locations (except in Complete Avoidance (S3 )). Moreover, these policies affect fewer student’s schedules and therefore fewer
people avoid campus due to completely remote schedules. Finally, LCPRank does not increase the percentage of people completely isolated on campus
(p-value: < 0.01:∗, < 0.001:∗∗).
Scenario S1: Persistence S2: Non-Res Avoidance S3: Complete Avoidance



















25.34(±12) 36.92(±14)∗∗34.30(±13)∗∗35.44(±10) 49.33(±11)∗∗52.19(±10)∗∗61.62(±7) 69.34(±5)∗∗ 64.44(±6)∗∗
Total Infections
(%)
6.99(±5) 10.63(±6)∗∗ 8.19(±5)∗∗ 14.88(±4) 13.96(±6)∗ 15.67(±6) 33.00(±5) 33.4(±5) 26.94(±5)∗∗
Internal Transmis-
sions (%)




58 18 19 58 38 50 58 192 124
Students Avoiding
(%)




5.42 8.40 8.40 5.95 5.72 5.71 7.09 5.18 5.23
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Table A.3: Comparison of different Localized closure policies with Betweenness Centrality (LCBCen) policies in terms of controlling the disease and
impacts on campus in Fall 2019; calibrated from week 0− 4 in Fall 2020 at GT. Within each scenario, we perform the Kruskal-Wallis H-Test [66] to
compare outcomes of LCBCen with RI. We find that LCBCen leads to significantly improved peak infection reduction and internal transmission, when
designed with the exposure risk budget, but can be worse with the mobility budget. In terms of reduction in total infections, the outcomes are typically
worse. In addition, every policy also exerts some burden on campus, either in terms of locations affected, students avoiding campus or isolation. We
observe that LCBCen policies focus on fewer locations (except in S3 ). Moreover, these policies affect fewer student’s schedules and therefore fewer
people avoid campus due to completely remote schedules. Finally, Localized closure policies with Load Centrality (LCLCen) does not increase the
percentage of people completely isolated on campus (p-value: < 0.01:∗, < 0.001:∗∗).
Scenario S1: Persistence S2: Non-Res Avoidance S3: Complete Avoidance



















25.34(±12) 19.14(±12)∗∗30.93(±13)∗∗35.44(±10) 30.79(±13)∗∗51.87(±10)∗∗61.62(±7) 65.07(±6)∗∗ 61.38(±7)
Total Infections
(%)
6.99(±5) 4.85(±4)∗∗ 7.74(±5) 14.88(±4) 7.76(±5)∗∗ 15.30(±6) 33.00(±5) 25.32(±5)∗∗ 22.08(±6)∗∗
Internal Transmis-
sions (%)




58 18 19 58 38 50 58 192 124
Students Avoiding
(%)




5.42 8.63 8.63 5.95 5.49 5.47 7.09 5.15 5.19
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Table A.4: Comparison of different Localized closure policies with Eigenvector Centrality (LCECen) policies in terms of controlling the disease and
impacts on campus in Fall 2019; calibrated from week 0 − 4 in Fall 2020 at GT. Within each scenario, we perform the Kruskal-Wallis H-Test [66]
to compare outcomes of LCECen with RI. We find that LCECen leads to significantly improved peak infection reduction and internal transmission.
In terms of reduction in total infections, the outcomes vary by specific scenarios. In addition, every policy also exerts some burden on campus,
either in terms of locations affected, students avoiding campus or isolation. We observe that LCECen policies focus on fewer locations (except in
S3 ). Moreover, these policies affect fewer student’s schedules and therefore fewer people avoid campus due to completely remote schedules. Finally,
LCECen does not increase the percentage of people completely isolated on campus (p-value: < 0.01:∗, < 0.001:∗∗).
Scenario S1: Persistence S2: Non-Res Avoidance S3: Complete Avoidance



















25.34(±12) 36.15(±13)∗∗36.13(±13)∗∗35.44(±10) 44.52(±12)∗∗51.33(±10)∗∗61.62(±7) 65.13(±6)∗∗ 62.15(±7)
Total Infections
(%)
6.99(±5) 8.66(±6)∗∗ 8.69(±6)∗∗ 14.88(±4) 11.75(±6)∗∗ 14.96(±6) 33.00(±5) 25.39(±5)∗∗ 22.82(±6)∗∗
Internal Transmis-
sions (%)




58 18 19 58 38 50 58 192 124
Students Avoiding
(%)




5.42 8.59 8.59 5.95 5.53 5.51 7.09 5.17 5.23
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Table A.5: Comparison of different LCLCen policies in terms of controlling the disease and impacts on campus in Fall 2019; calibrated from week
0 − 4 in Fall 2020 at GT. Within each scenario, we perform the Kruskal-Wallis H-Test [66] to compare outcomes of LCLCenwith RI. We find that
LCLCenleads to significantly improved peak infection reduction and internal transmission. In terms of reduction in total infections, the outcomes are
comparable in some scenarios but can vary in specific scenarios. In addition, every policy also exerts some burden on campus, either in terms of
locations affected, students avoiding campus or isolation. We observe that LCLCenpolicies focus on fewer locations (except in S3 ). Moreover, these
policies affect fewer student’s schedules and therefore fewer people avoid campus due to completely remote schedules. Finally, LCLCendoes not
increase the percentage of people completely isolated on campus (p-value: < 0.01:∗, < 0.001:∗∗).
Scenario S1: Persistence S2: Non-Res Avoidance S3: Complete Avoidance



















25.34(±12) 22.42(±13)∗∗30.73(±13)∗∗35.44(±10) 32.85(±13)∗51.44(±10)∗∗61.62(±7) 65.01(±6)∗∗ 61.40(±7)
Total Infections
(%)
6.99(±5) 5.48(±5)∗∗ 7.64(±5) 14.88(±4) 8.23(±5)∗∗ 15.03(±6) 33.00(±5) 25.33(±5)∗∗ 21.98(±6)∗∗
Internal Transmis-
sions (%)




58 18 19 58 38 50 58 192 124
Students Avoiding
(%)




5.42 8.63 8.63 5.95 5.49 5.47 7.09 5.15 5.20
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Table A.6: Comparison of different LCPRank policies in terms of controlling the disease and impacts on campus in Fall 2019; calibrated from week
5 − 9 in Fall 2020 at GT. Within each scenario, we perform the Kruskal-Wallis H-Test [66] to compare outcomes of LCPRank with RI. We find that
LCPRank leads to significantly improved peak infection reduction and internal transmission. In terms of reduction in total infections, the outcomes are
better in general but can be comparable in specific scenarios. The burden exerted on campus is the same as structural impacts of LCPRank (Table A.2).
(p-value: < 0.01:∗, < 0.001:∗∗).
Scenario S1: Persistence S2: Non-Res Avoidance S3: Complete Avoidance



















20.10(±4) 25.60(±3)∗∗ 25.63(±3)∗∗ 31.25(±3) 42.32(±4)∗∗ 47.29(±4)∗∗ 62.35(±2) 88.87(±2)∗∗ 76.89(±3)∗∗
Total Infections
(%)
8.89(±2) 10.50(±3)∗∗ 9.70(±3)∗∗ 20.26(±2) 20.02(±3) 23.71(±4)∗∗ 46.72(±2) 67.92(±4)∗∗ 51.30(±4)∗∗
Internal Transmis-
sions (%)
9.97(±2) 11.51(±2)∗∗ 10.95(±2)∗∗ 21.84(±2) 22.51(±3) 26.64(±3)∗∗ 49.80(±2) 74.96(±3)∗∗ 56.89(±4)∗∗
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Table A.7: Comparison of different LCPRank policies in terms of controlling the disease and impacts on campus in Fall 2019; calibrated from week
10− 14 in Fall 2020 at GT. Within each scenario, we perform the Kruskal-Wallis H-Test [66] to compare outcomes of LCPRank with RI. We find that
LCPRank leads to significantly improved peak infection reduction and internal transmission. In terms of reduction in total infections, the outcomes are
better in general but can be comparable in specific scenarios. The burden exerted on campus is the same as structural impacts of LCPRank (Table A.2).
(p-value: < 0.01:∗, < 0.001:∗∗).
Scenario S1: Persistence S2: Non-Res Avoidance S3: Complete Avoidance



















−1.75(±8) 3.65(±8)∗∗ −1.95(±8) 3.88(±8) −2.24(±8)∗∗−2.06(±8)∗∗20.39(±7) 7.57(±8)∗∗ 2.81(±8)∗∗
Total Infections
(%)
3.93(±9) 10.36(±8)∗∗ 5.13(±9) 9.87(±8) 6.36(±9)∗∗ 6.48(±9)∗∗ 26.02(±7) 16.37(±8)∗∗ 11.80(±8)∗∗
Internal Transmis-
sions (%)
42.33(±10) 61.15(±7)∗∗ 56.25(±8)∗∗ 49.83(±9) 67.10(±6)∗∗ 69.10(±6)∗∗ 74.74(±5) 84.80(±3)∗∗ 79.90(±4)∗∗
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Table A.8: Comparison of different LCPRank policies in terms of controlling the disease and impacts on campus in Fall 2019; calibrated from week
0 − 4 in Fall 2020 at UIUC. Within each scenario, we perform the Kruskal-Wallis H-Test [66] to compare outcomes of LCPRank with RI. We find
that LCPRank leads to significantly improved peak infection reduction, internal transmission and total infections. The burden exerted on campus is the
same as structural impacts of LCPRank (Table A.2). (p-value: < 0.01:∗, < 0.001:∗∗).
Scenario S1: Persistence S2: Non-Res Avoidance S3: Complete Avoidance



















41.40(±3) 60.44(±2)∗∗ 59.52(±2)∗∗ 49.75(±2) 74.22(±2)∗∗ 76.44(±2)∗∗ 78.14(±1) 85.81(±1)∗∗ 83.71(±1)∗∗
Total Infections
(%)
18.46(±3) 27.12(±3)∗∗ 25.25(±3)∗∗ 27.09(±3) 38.00(±4)∗∗ 40.68(±4)∗∗ 51.97(±3) 59.93(±5)∗∗ 54.07(±5)∗∗
Internal Transmis-
sions (%)
28.22(±3) 40.93(±3)∗∗ 39.09(±3)∗∗ 37.89(±3) 58.47(±2)∗∗ 65.45(±2)∗∗ 68.04(±2) 86.45(±1)∗∗ 80.08(±1)∗∗
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Table A.9: Comparison of different LCPRank policies in terms of controlling the disease and impacts on campus in Fall 2019; calibrated from week
0 − 4 in Fall 2020 at UC Berkeley. Within each scenario, we perform the Kruskal-Wallis H-Test [66] to compare outcomes of LCPRank with RI. We
find that LCPRank leads to significantly improved peak infection reduction, internal transmission and total infections. The burden exerted on campus
is the same as structural impacts of LCPRank (Table A.2). (p-value: < 0.01:∗, < 0.001:∗∗).
Scenario S1: Persistence S2: Non-Res Avoidance S3: Complete Avoidance



















29.13(±3) 36.46(±5)∗∗ 36.34(±5)∗∗ 38.83(±3) 54.95(±4)∗∗ 58.88(±4)∗∗ 66.69(±2) 78.18(±1)∗∗ 77.65(±2)∗∗
Total Infections
(%)
6.34(±3) 8.59(±3)∗∗ 7.28(±3)∗∗ 14.71(±3) 13.18(±4)∗∗ 14.83(±4) 33.86(±4) 33.98(±5) 27.10(±5)∗∗
Internal Transmis-
sions (%)
15.99(±3) 20.43(±4)∗∗ 19.17(±4)∗∗ 27.01(±3) 34.60(±4)∗∗ 38.78(±4)∗∗ 55.01(±2) 74.65(±2)∗∗ 63.57(±3)∗∗
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(b) Calibrating on the weeks 0-4














(c) Calibrating on the weeks 5-9














(d) Calibrating on the weeks 10-14
Figure A.1: We calibrate NABM on positivity rates from Fall 2020 at GT. The objective
function of the calibration is to minimize the r.m.s.e. with the weeekly average of posi-
tivity rate obtained from surveillance testing results at GT [49]. (a) The parameter that
determines external transmission of infections on a given day, Iout(t), is a function of cases
in Fulton county (where GT is located). (b) The models discussed in the main paper are
calibrated using the first 5 weeks of data. We illustrate the output for a range of parameters
that incorporate quantitative uncertainty, i.e., within 40% of the r.m.s.e. (c, d) illustrate cal-
ibration on the second period of 5 weeks and third period of 5 weeks respectively. These
only show the optimal parameter output. The shaded region around the lines show the 2.5th
and 97.5th percentile.
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(b) Calibrating on the weeks 0-4
Figure A.2: We calibrate NABM on positivity rates from first 5 weeks of Fall 2020 at
UIUC. The objective function of the calibration is to minimize the r.m.s.e. with the weekly
average of positivity rate obtained from surveillance testing results at GT [49]. (a) The
parameter that determines external transmission of infections on a given day, Iout(t), is
a function of cases in Champaign county (where UIUC is located). (b) We illustrate the
output for a range of parameters that incorporate quantitative uncertainty, i.e., within 40%
of the r.m.s.e. The shaded region around the lines show the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile.
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(b) Calibrating on the weeks 0-4
Figure A.3: Calibration Results (UC Berkeley).
Figure A.4: We calibrate NABM on positivity rates from first 5 weeks of Fall 2020 at UC
Berkeley. The objective function of the calibration is to minimize the r.m.s.e. with the
weekly average of positivity rate obtained from surveillance testing results at GT [49]. (a)
The parameter that determines external transmission of infections on a given day, Iout(t),
is a function of cases in Alameda county (where UIUC is located). (b) We illustrate the
output for a range of parameters that incorporate quantitative uncertainty, i.e., within 40%


























































































































































































































(f) Internal Transmission Re-
duction Percentage (LCBCen)
Figure A.5: Disease control outcomes in Fall 2019 for different algorithms of LC with the
NABM is calibrated on weeks 0 − 4 of Fall 2020 at GT. (a − c) Comparison of RI with
LCPRank. Under all scenarios, for peak infection reduction (b) and internal transmission
reduction (c), LCPRank shows better disease control outcomes than RI. For total infection
reduction (b), LCPRank is better in Persistent Scenario (S1 ), worse in S3 when designed
within an exposure risk budget, and comparable in others. (d− f) Comparison of RI with
LCBCen. Under all scenarios, for peak infection reduction (d) and internal transmission
reduction (f) LCBCen is better when designed within an exposure risk budget. For total


























































































































































































































(f) Internal Transmission Re-
duction Percentage (LCLCen)
Figure A.6: Disease control outcomes in Fall 2019 for different algorithms of LC with the
NABM is calibrated on weeks 0 − 4 of Fall 2020 at GT. (a − c) Comparison of RI with
LCECen. Under all scenarios, for peak infection reduction (b) and internal transmission
reduction (c), LCECen shows better disease control outcomes than RI. For total infection
reduction (b), LCECen is better in S1 and worse in S3when designed within an exposure
risk budget. (d−f) Comparison of RI with LCECen. Under all scenarios, for peak infection
reduction (d) and internal transmission reduction (f), LCECen shows better disease control
outcomes than RI. For total infection reduction (e), LCECen is better in S1 and worse in








































(a) Peak Transmission Reduc-

































(b) Total Infections Reduction





































(c) Internal Transmission Re-





































































(e) Total Infections Reduction





































(f) Internal Transmission Re-
duction Percentage (Weeks
10 - 14)
Figure A.7: Disease control outcomes in Fall 2019 for LCPRank. (a − c) The NABM was
calibrated on weeks 5−9 of Fall 2020 at GT. Under all scenarios, for all outcomes, LCPRank
is better than RI. (d− f) The NABM was calibrated on weeks 10− 14 of Fall 2020 at GT.


























































































































































































































(f) Internal Transmission Re-
duction Percentage (UCB)
Figure A.8: Disease control outcomes in Fall 2019 for LCPRank. (a − c) The NABM was
calibrated on weeks 0 − 4 of Fall 2020 at UIUC. Under all scenarios, for all outcomes,
LCPRank is better than RI. (d− f) The NABM was calibrated on weeks 0− 4 of Fall 2020









































































































































































































































































































Figure A.9: Cumulative infections in Fall 2019 while comparing RI and LCPRank with NABM calibrated on weeks 0−4 of Fall 2020, GT. The bands show the 2.75th
and 97.25th percentile. (a − c) Total infections of interventions is lower than no-intervention scenarios and is lowest in the S3 scenario. In this scenario, the mobility budget is
69% of what it would be without interventions, and therefore the transmissions are also contained. In comparison, in Fall 2020, we saw far fewer infections which is because the
mobility was 39% of that in Fall 2019. (d − f) Internal transmissions are lower with LCPRank in comparison to RI. (g − i) External transmissions are higher with LCPRank in









































































































































































































































































































Figure A.10: Cumulative infections in Fall 2019 while comparing RI and LCBCen with NABM calibrated on weeks 0 − 4 of Fall 2020, GT. The bands show the
2.75th and 97.25th percentile. (a − c) Total infections of interventions is lower than no-intervention scenarios and is lowest in the S3 scenario. In this scenario, the mobility
budget is 69% of what it would be without interventions, and therefore the transmissions are also contained. In comparison, in Fall 2020, we saw far fewer infections which is
because the mobility was 39% of that in Fall 2019. (d − f) Internal transmissions are lower with LCBCen in comparison to RI, only when constrained under the exposure risk










































































































































































































































































































Figure A.11: Cumulative infections in Fall 2019 while comparing RI and LCECen with NABM calibrated on weeks 0 − 4 of Fall 2020, GT. The bands show the
2.75th and 97.25th percentile. (a − c) Total infections of interventions is lower than no-intervention scenarios and is lowest in the S3 scenario. In this scenario, the mobility
budget is 69% of what it would be without interventions, and therefore the transmissions are also contained. In comparison, in Fall 2020, we saw far fewer infections which is
because the mobility was 39% of that in Fall 2019. (d − f) Internal transmissions are lower with LCECen in comparison to RI. (g − i) External transmissions are higher with









































































































































































































































































































Figure A.12: Cumulative infections in Fall 2019 while comparing RI and LCLCen with NABM calibrated on weeks 0 − 4 of Fall 2020, GT. The bands show the
2.75th and 97.25th percentile. (a − c) Total infections of interventions is lower than no-intervention scenarios and is lowest in the S3 scenario. In this scenario, the mobility
budget is 69% of what it would be without interventions, and therefore the transmissions are also contained. In comparison, in Fall 2020, we saw far fewer infections which is
because the mobility was 39% of that in Fall 2019. (d − f) Internal transmissions are lower with LCLCen in comparison to RI. (g − i) External transmissions are higher with





































(a) S1 (NABM calibrated on





























(b) S2 (NABM calibrated on





























(c) S3 (NABM calibrated on
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(f) S3 (NABM calibrated on

































(g) S1 (NABM calibrated on

































(h) S2 (NABM calibrated on

































(i) S3 (NABM calibrated on
weeks 5 - 9 at GT)
Figure A.13: Cumulative infections in Fall 2019 while comparing RI and LCPRank with NABM calibrated on weeks 5 − 9 of Fall 2020, GT. The bands show the
2.75th and 97.25th percentile. (a − c) Total infections of interventions is lower than no-intervention scenarios and is lowest in the S3 scenario. In this scenario, the mobility
budget is 69% of what it would be without interventions, and therefore the transmissions are also contained. In comparison, in Fall 2020, we saw far fewer infections which is
because the mobility was 39% of that in Fall 2019. (d − f) Internal transmissions are lower with LCPRank in comparison to RI. (g − i) External transmissions are higher with





































(a) S1 (NABM calibrated on





























(b) S2 (NABM calibrated on





























(c) S3 (NABM calibrated on


































(d) S1 (NABM calibrated on
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(f) S3 (NABM calibrated on
































(g) S1 (NABM calibrated on
































(h) S2 (NABM calibrated on
































(i) S3 (NABM calibrated on
weeks 10 - 14 at GT)
Figure A.14: Cumulative infections in Fall 2019 while comparing RI and LCPRank with NABM calibrated on weeks 10 − 14 of Fall 2020, GT. The bands show the
2.75th and 97.25th percentile. (a − c) Total infections of interventions is lower than no-intervention scenarios and is lowest in the S3 scenario. In this scenario, the mobility
budget is 69% of what it would be without interventions, and therefore the transmissions are also contained. In comparison, in Fall 2020, we saw far fewer infections which is
because the mobility was 39% of that in Fall 2019. (d − f) Internal transmissions are lower with LCPRank in comparison to RI. (g − i) External transmissions are higher with






















































































































































































































































































































(i) S3 (NABM calibrated on
UIUC data)
Figure A.15: Cumulative infections in Fall 2019 while comparing RI and LCPRank with NABM calibrated on weeks 0 − 4 of Fall 2020, UIUC. The bands show the
2.75th and 97.25th percentile. (a − c) Total infections of interventions is lower than no-intervention scenarios and is lowest in the S3 scenario. In this scenario, the mobility
budget is 69% of what it would be without interventions, and therefore the transmissions are also contained. In comparison, in Fall 2020, we saw far fewer infections which is
because the mobility was 39% of that in Fall 2019. (d − f) Internal transmissions are lower with LCPRank in comparison to RI. (g − i) External transmissions are higher with
















































































































































































































































































































(i) S3 (NABM calibrated on
UC Berkeley data)
Figure A.16: Cumulative infections in Fall 2019 while comparing RI and LCPRank with NABM calibrated on weeks 0 − 4 of Fall 2020, UC Berkeley. The bands
show the 2.75th and 97.25th percentile. (a − c) Total infections of interventions is lower than no-intervention scenarios and is lowest in the S3 scenario. In this scenario, the
mobility budget is 69% of what it would be without interventions, and therefore the transmissions are also contained. In comparison, in Fall 2020, we saw far fewer infections which
is because the mobility was 39% of that in Fall 2019. (d− f) Internal transmissions are lower with LCPRank in comparison to RI. (g− i) External transmissions are higher with
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Figure A.17: The locations shutdown by each policy are grouped into the the general build-
ing category. The distribution of locations is different between policies, for example, in S1
(a) and Non-residential Avoidance (S2 ) (b), LC closes fewer locations that RI. Even when
targeting spaces in similar buildings, the locations are qualitatively different — RI only af-
fects classrooms, whereas LC also closes smaller spaces like breakout rooms, reading areas
and cafes. LC In S3 (c) we find LC to target locations in a greater variety of buildings, but
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Figure A.18: The locations shutdown by each policy are grouped into the the general build-
ing category. The distribution of locations is different between policies, for example, in S1
(a) and S2 (b), LC closes fewer locations that RI. Even when targeting spaces in similar
buildings, the locations are qualitatively different — RI only affects classrooms, whereas
LC also closes smaller spaces like breakout rooms, reading areas and cafes. LC In S3 (c)
we find LC to target locations in a greater variety of buildings, but it also targets more
locations to utilize the budget.
87
REFERENCES
[1] C. for Disease Control, P. (CDC, et al., “Mumps outbreak on a university campus–
california, 2011,” MMWR. Morbidity and mortality weekly report, vol. 61, no. 48,
pp. 986–989, 2012.
[2] R. W. Amler, R. J. Kim-Farley, W. A. Orenstein, S. W. Doster, and K. J. Bart,
“Measles on campus,” Journal of American College Health, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 53–
57, 1983.
[3] W. H. Organization et al., “Critical preparedness, readiness and response actions
for covid-19: Interim guidance, 22 march 2020,” World Health Organization, Tech.
Rep., 2020.
[4] E. Wilson, C. V. Donovan, M. Campbell, T. Chai, K. Pittman, A. C. Seña, A. Pet-
tifor, D. J. Weber, A. Mallick, A. Cope, et al., “Multiple covid-19 clusters on a
university campus—north carolina, august 2020,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report, vol. 69, no. 39, p. 1416, 2020.
[5] E. Mahmud, H. L. Dauerman, F. G. Welt, J. C. Messenger, S. V. Rao, C. Grines,
A. Mattu, A. J. Kirtane, R. Jauhar, P. Meraj, et al., “Management of acute myocar-
dial infarction during the covid-19 pandemic,” Journal of the American College of
Cardiology, 2020.
[6] M. Harris and K. Holley, “Universities as anchor institutions: Economic and social
potential for urban development,” in Higher education: Handbook of theory and
research, Springer, 2016, pp. 393–439.
[7] S. Watson, S. Hubler, D. Ivory, and R. Gebeloff, A new front in america’s pandemic:
College towns, Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/06/us/colleges-
coronavirus-students.html, 2020.
[8] N. Hasan and Y. Bao, “Impact of “e-learning crack-up” perception on psychological
distress among college students during covid-19 pandemic: A mediating role of “fear
of academic year loss”,” Children and Youth Services Review, vol. 118, p. 105 355,
2020.
[9] L. Murphy, N. B. Eduljee, and K. Croteau, “College student transition to synchronous
virtual classes during the covid-19 pandemic in northeastern united states.,” Peda-
gogical Research, vol. 5, no. 4, 2020.
[10] B. Lopman, C. Y. Liu, A. Le Guillou, A. Handel, T. L. Lash, A. P. Isakov, and
S. M. Jenness, “A modeling study to inform screening and testing interventions for
88
the control of sars-cov-2 on university campuses,” Scientific Reports, vol. 11, no. 1,
pp. 1–11, 2021.
[11] A. D. Paltiel, A. Zheng, and R. P. Walensky, “Assessment of sars-cov-2 screening
strategies to permit the safe reopening of college campuses in the united states,”
JAMA network open, vol. 3, no. 7, e2016818–e2016818, 2020.
[12] J. M. Cashore, N. Duan, A. Janmohamed, J. Wan, Y. Zhang, S. Henderson, D.
Shmoys, and P. Frazier, “Covid-19 mathematical modeling for cornell’s fall semester
(2020),” URL https://people. orie. cornell. edu/pfrazier/COVID, vol. 19,
[13] I. Holmdahl and C. Buckee, “Wrong but useful—what covid-19 epidemiologic mod-
els can and cannot tell us,” New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 383, no. 4,
pp. 303–305, 2020.
[14] R. Bahl, N. Eikmeier, A. Fraser, M. Junge, F. Keesing, K. Nakahata, and L. Z. Wang,
“Modeling covid-19 spread in small colleges,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2008.09597,
2020.
[15] E. M. Hill, B. D. Atkins, M. J. Keeling, M. Tildesley, and L. Dyson, “Modelling
sars-cov-2 transmission in a uk university setting,” medRxiv, 2020.
[16] E. Bonabeau, “Agent-based modeling: Methods and techniques for simulating hu-
man systems,” Proceedings of the national academy of sciences, vol. 99, no. suppl
3, pp. 7280–7287, 2002.
[17] K. A. Weeden and B. Cornwell, “The small-world network of college classes: Im-
plications for epidemic spread on a university campus,” Sociological science, vol. 7,
pp. 222–241, 2020.
[18] P. T. Gressman and J. R. Peck, “Simulating covid-19 in a university environment,”
Mathematical biosciences, vol. 328, p. 108 436, 2020.
[19] M. Borowiak, F. Ning, J. Pei, S. Zhao, H.-R. Tung, and R. Durrett, “Controlling the
spread of covid-19 on college campuses,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2008.07293, 2020.
[20] M. Garner, S. Hamilton, et al., “Principles of epidemiological modelling,” Revue
Scientifique et Technique-OIE, vol. 30, no. 2, p. 407, 2011.
[21] V. Subramanian and M. W. Kattan, “Why is modeling coronavirus disease 2019 so
difficult?” Chest, vol. 158, no. 5, p. 1829, 2020.
[22] P. Holme, “Model versions and fast algorithms for network epidemiology,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1403.1011, 2014.
89
[23] L. Meyers, “Contact network epidemiology: Bond percolation applied to infectious
disease prediction and control,” Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society,
vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 63–86, 2007.
[24] K. Dietz and J. Heesterbeek, “Daniel bernoulli’s epidemiological model revisited,”
Mathematical biosciences, vol. 180, no. 1-2, pp. 1–21, 2002.
[25] M. Mandal, S. Jana, S. K. Nandi, A. Khatua, S. Adak, and T. Kar, “A model based
study on the dynamics of covid-19: Prediction and control,” Chaos, Solitons & Frac-
tals, vol. 136, p. 109 889, 2020.
[26] S. Wan, Y. Xiang, W. Fang, Y. Zheng, B. Li, Y. Hu, C. Lang, D. Huang, Q. Sun,
Y. Xiong, et al., “Clinical features and treatment of covid-19 patients in northeast
chongqing,” Journal of medical virology, vol. 92, no. 7, pp. 797–806, 2020.
[27] W. Song, J. Li, N. Zou, W. Guan, J. Pan, and W. Xu, “Clinical features of pediatric
patients with coronavirus disease (covid-19),” Journal of Clinical Virology, vol. 127,
p. 104 377, 2020.
[28] F. Brauer, “Compartmental models in epidemiology,” in Mathematical epidemiol-
ogy, Springer, 2008, pp. 19–79.
[29] H. W. Hethcote, “The mathematics of infectious diseases,” SIAM review, vol. 42,
no. 4, pp. 599–653, 2000.
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